Point of Law: Section 33C(2) is more comprehensive than Section 33C(1). Section 33C(2) applies not only to cases of settlement or award or cases under Chapter VA of the Act, but to other cases as well. By a process of computation or calculation to be applied by it, the Labour Court has to determine the amount due

ORDER :

1. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is at the instance of the original writ applicants and is directed against the impugned order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 17th March, 2017 in the Special Civil Application No.4506 of 2017, by which, the learned Single Judge rejected the writ application and thereby affirmed the order passed by the Labour Court rejecting the application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the I.D. Act”).

2. The facts, giving rise to this appeal, may be summarized as under;

2.1 The appellants herein are the original writ applicants. The appellants preferred an application before the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act on the premise that the respondent-employer had closed its unit, and as a consequence thereof, it had a statutory liability under Section 25FFF of the I.D. Act to pay compensation with notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The application came to be rejected on the ground that the criteria prescribed under Section 25B of the Act was required to be established in some substantial proceedings and the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act being in the nature of the execution proceedings, such issue cannot be determined. In such circumstances, referred to above, the writ applicants had to come before this Court by filing the Special Civil Application No.4506 of 2017.

2.2 The learned Single Judge, while adjudicating the writ application, took notice of the fact that the closure of the unit by the respondent was not disputed but the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act was contested by the employer. The learned Single Judge rejected the application thereby affirming the award passed by the Labour Court substantially on the ground that the claim made by the workman is by placing reliance on Section 25FFF of the Act. The learned Single Judge laid much emphasis on the phrase “workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year”. The learned Single Judge took the view that the pre-requirement of Section 25FFF is “continuous service” as defined in Section 25B of the Act, and only if such criteria is satisfied, the workman would be entitled to compensation as indicated in Section 25F of the Act. According to the learned Single Judge, whether the workman was in continuous service for not less than one year would be a question of fact and the entitlement of the workman would depend upon the proof of such fact. Therefore, ultimately, the learned Single Judge, while affirming the award passed by the Labour Court held that as under;

“4.2 True, in the instant case, the employer has not disputed certain factual aspects. The closure was not disputed but the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 33C(2) of the Act was contested by the employer.

4.3 Claim is made by the workmen while relying upon section 25FFF of the Act. The said provision employs phrase “workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year”. Thus, pre-requirement of section 25FFF is “continuous service” as defined in section 25B of the Act. If the said criteria is satisfied the workmen would be entitled to compensation as indicated in section 25F of the Act. Whether or not, the workman has been in continuous service for not less than one year is a question of fact and the “entitlement” of the workmen would depend upon the proof of this fact. Such proof can be tendered to the judicial forum having the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the fact in issue. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the fact in issue may be proved by tendering cogent oral or documentary evidence in support of it or by non-denial by the adversary against whom the proof is so tendered; by adverse inference or by such mode permissible under law. The question is not whether how and in what manner the undenied fact in issue may constitute evidence; but the real question