Point of Law: Provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, therefore, cannot be applied to the Petitioner Trust which is admittedly running and maintaining ‘Panjrapole/Gaushala’ only on the land in question

ORDER :

1. The Petitioner Trust has filed this writ petition aggrieved by the order dated 23.10.2007 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, confirming the order dated 15.03.1993 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, Vav in Ceiling Case No. 1 of 1993 which was confirmed by the Deputy Collector, Tharad in Ceiling Appeal No. 3 of 1993 on 30.11.1993, declaring 186 acres 36 gunthas as surplus land under provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1960.

2. In the earlier round of litigation, the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: Jayant Patel, J.) in Special Civil Application No. 3533 of 1996, Kirtibhai Chimanlal Parekh vs. Mamlatdar Vav and Others had remanded the case back to the Tribunal with the following observations:

“8. Even if the matter is considered on the basis that the benefits of Section 3(ddd) of the Act are not available to the petitioner Trust having rejected the application, the Tribunal has not examined the aspect qua the exemption already available to the petitioner Trust prior to 1.4.1976 in light of the decision of this Court in case of Shri Ranpur Khoda Dhor Panjarapole vs. State of Gujarat and Others (supra). If the exemption continues to apply in view of Section 3(dd), it would be required for the Tribunal to consider as to whether any land could be said as holding for its declaration as surplus land as per the provisions of the Act. The perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal, shows that the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that as no exemption was available in view of Section 3(ddd) of the Act, the land can be considered for the purpose of computation while conducting the ceiling case. Even the lower authorities have already proceeded on that basis. Therefore, it appears that since the aforesaid aspect is not considered by the Tribunal for the availability of the exemption to the petitioner Trust qua the agricultural land as per Section 3(dd) of the Act, the matter deserves to be remanded to the Tribunal for its reconsideration to that extent.”

3. After the remand, the Tribunal passed the order on 23.10.2007 again rejecting the case of the Petitioner with the following observations:

OTHERS LANGUAGE

4. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner again approached this Court by way of this writ petition filed before this Court on 30.11.2007.

5. During the course of arguments, Mr. Bharat Rao, learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted before this Court that two significant developments have taken place in the matter during the pendency of this petition since 2007 in this Court:

(i) The Trust in question for running the ‘Panjrapole/Gaushala’ in question has been registered as a separate Public Charitable Trust under provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 under the name and style of Shree Dheema Mahajan Khodadhor Panjrapole, vide Registration No. E/1221/Banaskantha on 28.10.2008 (date) by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Palanpur, registering Trust Deed dated 13.10.2008.

(ii) A Notification of Revenue Department of Government of Gujarat No. GHM-2020-M-ALC-102016-CM-102-CHH dated 05.10.2020 waiving the period of registration as separate Public Charitable Trust in case of ‘Panjrapole/Gaushala’ as falling within the meaning of Section 3(ddd) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960.

6. He, therefore, submitted that in view of the waiver of the period by the State Government and registration of the Petitioner as a separate Trust under provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, the orders against the Petitioner Trust of the Authorities and Tribunal below cannot survive now and the Petitioner Trust cannot be made subject to the Ceiling Law under provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 as it is admittedly maintaining ‘Panjrapole/Gaushala’ only. Copies of these two Documents have been supplied to the learned Assistant Government Pleader also, who does not dispute the same.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court is therefore of the cle