Point of law: The word “equivalent” must be given a reasonable meaning. By using the expression “equivalent” one means that there are some degrees of flexibility of adjustment which do not lower the stated requirement. There has to be some difference between that is equivalent and what is exact. Apart from that, after a person is provisionally selected, a certain degree of reasonable expectation of the selection being continued also comes into existence.

JUDGMENT :

[1] These petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are arising out of identical facts and the contentions and the issues are also common and hence, with consent of all the parties, both the petitions are taken up for joint hearing and disposal. The facts are recorded from Special Civil Application No.1123 of 2018.

[2] This petition is filed seeking direction to give appointment to the petitioner as Shikshan Sahayak/teacher in the Grant-in-Aid Higher Secondary School as per the District allotment list. It is the case of the petitioner that despite the petitioner being fully qualified and having cleared all the necessary selection procedure and was also selected, but thereafter considering the degree of the petitioner in the subject of “Industrial Chemistry” as against the qualification advertised being “Chemistry”, the petitioner was treated to be disqualified for appointment.

[3] Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the recruitment is governed by the Teachers of Government Secondary and Higher Secondary Schools (Procedure for Selection) Rules, 2012. According to the said Rules, the candidate is required to possess the requisite educational qualification as per Regulation-20 of the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Rules, 1974. He submits that as per the advertisement, the candidate is required to possess Bachelor’s Degree in concerned subject and B.Ed. And TAT. The petitioner is possessing the said qualifications also. The weightage for TAT is 70%. Accordingly, the petitioner gets Merit Mark 60.32. The petitioner is therefore, clearly entitled to the appointment, and the denial of appointment to him by the respondents is wholly unjustified.

[3.1] Learned advocate submits that the subject of “Industrial Chemistry” is much wider and modern as compared to the popularly known subject of “Chemistry” and therefore, the respondents cannot deny appointment on the ground that the petitioner has the subject of “Industrial Chemistry” instead of “Chemistry” in the M.Sc.. The respondents are required to take holistic view and not hypertechnical view of the matter. Once the petitioner is selected for the post, he has the legitimate expectations of the selection being continued, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrakala Trivedi v/s. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 129.

[3.2] He submits that the Education Department-the respondent No.1 herein vide amendment dated 17.10.2017 and 21.12.2017 carried an amendment in Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Rules, 1974 and thereby specified the subjects of concerned faculty which covers the subject of “Industrial Chemistry”, as is the subject of the petitioner in the present case. However, the Education Department-the respondent No.1 herein has brought into necessary amendment in the notification the petitioner is denied appointment by citing reason of his subject being “Industrial Chemistry” which is already covered/included by the respondent herein in the amendments already carried out so far.

[3.3] Learned advocate for the respondent has relied upon the decision in the case of Manish Mansukh Raghadal v/s. State of Gujarat, reported in 2018 JX(Guj.) 630 and unreported judgment in the case of Prakashukumar Jeshingbhai Patel v/s. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No.21005 of 2016.

[4] As against this, learned advocate for the respondents opposed the petition by submitting that no aspirant of a recruitment can presume a right for being appointed. No such right exists or is identified in law. That, mere inclusion in the select list cannot entail a right to be appointed. The presumption of a right vested in the petitioner to prefer the present petition for the ventilated cause of action is thus ill founded.

[4.1] It is submitted that petitioner's candidature may have to be evalued in consonance with the p