JUDGMENT :

A.J. Shastri, J.

1. This application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking for condonation of delay of 509 days. The cause of the delay has been explained in the application.

2. While considering an application for condonation of delay it is not the length of delay but cause for delay which would be of paramount consideration. If the cause shown is sufficient and in the proximity of the facts obtained, such delay deserves to be condoned irrespective of the length of delay. However, even if there is short delay and cause shown is not in the proximity of truth or contrary to facts, such delay cannot be condoned.

3. At this juncture, we may notice that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Master Katiji and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353, whereunder the Lordships have illustratively narrated the contour of the parameters required to be considered while examining the application for condonation of delay.

4. It has been further held by the Apex Court as under:

3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice -- that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condo