IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between termination simpliciter and punitive termination based on the nature of the inquiry and the purpose of the termination.

JUDGMENT :

BIREN VAISHNAV, J.

1. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been filed by the original petitioner challenging the judgment and order dated 07.01.2016 passed in Special Civil Application No.22763 of 2006. By the CAV Judgment dated 07.01.2016, the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition of the appellant herein.

2. Brief narration of facts which have been set out by the learned Single Judge and which would suffice for the purposes of this judgment read as under:

“1. By preferring this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has, inter alia, challenged the order dated 05.09.2006, passed by respondent No.1-State of Gujarat, whereby, the services of the petitioner have been put to an end during her period of probation, on the ground that they were not found to be satisfactory. The petitioner has further prayed for a direction to the respondents to re-employ her on the original post by protecting her inter-se seniority and to pay her full back-wages/ salary with interest at the prevailing Bank rate.

2. A brief factual narration of the facts, as stated in the petition, would be necessary. In response to the public advertisement issued by the Gujarat Public Service Commission (“GPSC”) for the post of Assistant Charity Commissioner (Class-I), the petitioner, being qualified, applied for the post and was selected through the competitive written examination and oral interview. The GPSC recommended the name of the petitioner by letter dated 16.10.2001, for the said post, to respondent No.1. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Charity Commissioner on probation, for a period of two years from joining the service, vide order dated 23.04.2002, passed by respondent No.1. She joined her duties on 30.04.2002, at the Regional Office, Valsad. The petitioner was, thereafter, transferred and posted at the Regional Office, Junagadh and subsequently, at the Regional Office, Amreli. During her posting at the Regional Office Valsad, the petitioner was also given additional charge of Regional Offices, Godhara, Navsari and Dahod. While she was serving at the Regional Office, Junagadh, the petitioner was given the additional charge of Regional Office, Porbandar. It is the case of the petitioner that during her entire period of service, she has not received any communication with regard to the extension of her probation period and nor has she received any show cause notice contemplating the initiation of any disciplinary action against her. During her posting at Junagadh, a written explanation from the petitioner was called for by respondent No.2, with regard to an episode involving the “Dharna” and fast by a local political leader and Member of the Legislative Assembly (“MLA”) regarding a Change Report of a Trust, of which the said MLA was the President. The petitioner submitted her explanation vide letters dated 06.04.2005 and 15.04.2005. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred from the Regional Office, Junagadh, to the Regional Office, Amreli.

3. It appears that the petitioner was also implicated in a criminal case filed by the Deputy Charity Commissioner and an FIR dated 20.06.2005, was filed against the then Deputy Charity Commissioner. In this matter as well, the petitioner did not receive any intimation regarding departmental action being initiated against her. While the petitioner was working as Assistant Charity Commissioner at the Regional Office, Amreli, her services were terminated by the impugned order. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court, by way of the present petition.”

3. Mr.Shalin Mehta learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr.Manan Paneri learned advocate for the appellant would submit as under:

3.1 That the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on two grounds. It was the case of the petitioner-appellant herein before the learned Single Judge that on account of extended period of probation, the appellant ought to have been treated as deemed to ha