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2026 Supreme(Guj) 194

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
P. M. Raval, J.
Rajeshbhai Laljibhai Patel – Applicant
Versus
State Of Gujarat & Anr. – Respondents
R/Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 7316 of 2026
Decided On : 01-06-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Applicant : Nishith P Acharya
For the Respondent: Mr K.M. Antani, APP

A court lacks the jurisdiction to declare an individual a 'proclaimed offender' unless they are accused of one of the specific serious offences enumerated in the relevant statutory provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and such declaration is invalid without following the mandatory inquiry procedure defined by law.

Headnote:(A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 82, 83, 84 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 174, 174A - Provisions regarding proclamation for person absconding - Person declared as proclaimed offender - Requirement of being accused of specific offences under Section 82(4) - Legislative intent behind mandatory inquiry - Distinction between 'proclaimed person' and 'proclaimed offender' - Unless the offence is included in the list of serious offences under Section 82(4), a court cannot pronounce an individual as a proclaimed offender. (Paras 14, 18, 19, 27)

Facts of the case:
An application challenged an order whereby a trial court rejected a plea against the attachment of property. The applicant’s father was the primary accused in a case involving the dishonour of cheques and had been declared a proclaimed offender, leading to attachment proceedings. The applicant contended that the declaration of his father as a proclaimed offender was legally unsustainable as the offence under the relevant special act was not among those enumerated in Section 82(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Findings of Court:
The court analyzed the scheme of Sections 82-85 and observed that the term 'proclaimed offender' is distinct from 'proclaimed person.' The legislature specifically provided a safeguard of an inquiry under Section 82(4) for serious offences, and it would be contrary to legislative intent to apply the adverse consequences of being tagged a 'proclaimed offender' to persons accused of less serious offences or those not specified in the statutory list. The proceedings were found to be without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether a person who is not accused of any of the specific offences mentioned in Section 82(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be legally declared a 'proclaimed offender,' and whether such declaration attracts the same legal consequences as those accused of serious crimes.

Ratio Decidendi: There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, other than Section 82(4), under which a court can pronounce a person as a proclaimed offender. Such designation is reserved strictly for those accused of specific serious crimes, and any declaration issued against persons not falling into that category must be quashed as it lacks the required statutory basis and fails to comply with the mandatory protective inquiry procedures.

Result: Petition allowed; impugned orders and consequential proceedings quashed and set aside.

Table of Content
1. procedural initiation and identification of the impugned order. (Para 1 , 2 , 3)
2. parties' contentions regarding jurisdiction and limitation in section 84 crpc proceedings. (Para 4 , 5)
3. factual assessment of the missing person report and service of summons. (Para 6 , 7 , 11 , 12 , 13)
4. interpretation of section 82 crpc regarding 'proclaimed offender' status for specific offenses. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26)
5. ratio that non-section 82(4) offenses do not warrant 'proclaimed offender' declarations. (Para 27 , 28 , 29 , 30)

ORDER :

P. M. Raval, J.

1. Rule fixed forthwith. Learned APP waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondent–State.

2. Heard learned advocate Mr. N.P. Acharya for the applicant and learned APP Mr. K.M. Antani for the respondent–State.

3. By way of the present writ petition, the applicant has assailed the order dated 07.05.2026 passed below Exh.24 in Criminal Case No.17 of 2018 by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Dhandhuka, Ahmedabad (Rural), whereby the application preferred under Section 84 of the Cr.P.C. came to be rejected on the ground that the same was barred by limitation, having not been filed within six months from the date of attachment, and also on merits.

4. Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that the Delhi High Court as well as the Punjab and Haryana High Court have consistently taken the view that, in the absence of a person being declared a proclaimed offender after following the procedure prescribed under the Cr.P.C., the consequential proceedings cannot be sustained. It is further submitted that only in respect of the offences enumerated under sub-clause (4) of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. can a person be declared a proclaimed offender. Since an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not one of the offences contemplated under Section 82(4) of the Cr.P.C., the proceedings undertaken by the trial Court are without jurisdiction. On the aforesaid grounds, it is urged that the present petition be allowed.

5. Learned APP Mr. K.M. Antani, on the other hand, submitted that the facts involved in the judgments relied upon by the applicant are distinguishable. According to him, in those cases the challenge was to FIRs registered under Section 174A of the IPC, whereas in the present case the applicant has challenged an order passed by the learned trial Court under Section 84 of the Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the application under Section 84 was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed period and was therefore rightly rejected as time-barred. Learned APP further submitted that, if at all the applicant is aggrieved by the order passed by the Magistrate, he has an alternative remedy under Section 84(4) of the Cr.P.C. to establish his right in respect of the property in dispute within a period of one year from the date of such order. Under the circumstances, it is urged that the present petition be rejected.

6. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties. This Court has gone through the impugned order as well as the correspondence produced at Exh.21 on record. The letter dated 10.02.2026 written by the Senior Police Inspector, Vashi Police Station, Navi Mumbai, clearly indicates that vide communication dated 09.02.2026, the Circle Officer, Belapur, Navi Mumbai, had initiated the process of attachment of the property. The said communication further reveals that it would take approximately 10 to 15 days to complete the entire procedure. Thus, it transpires that as on 10.02.2026, the attachment of the property had not been completed. It further transpires from the panchnama placed on record that the attachment proceedings were ultimately carried out on 13.05.2026.

7. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the present applicant, who is the son of the original accused facing trial under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, had already lodged a missing person complaint regarding

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