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1975 Supreme(Gau) 4
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
D. PATHAK, J.
SHANKARLAL SARMA (BHATRA)
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER
Criminal Revn. No. 180 of 1973,
Decided on : 4 -3 -1975.
The obstruction of a private way in good faith is not an offence under Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code.
Headnote:
WRONGFUL RESTRAINT - SECTION 339, INDIAN PENAL CODE - OBSTRUCTION OF VEHICLE - NOT WRONGFUL RESTRAINT - EXCEPTION TO SECTION 339, INDIAN PENAL CODE - GOOD FAITH BELIEF IN LAWFUL RIGHT TO OBSTRUCT - COMMON PATHWAY - NO OBSTRUCTION OF HUMAN BODY - QUASHING OF PROCEEDINGS.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was charged under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code for allegedly obstructing the complainant's car from exiting a common pathway. The complainant filed a complaint with the police, alleging that the petitioner had parked his car in front of the complainant's garage, blocking the passage. The petitioner claimed that he had a lawful right to obstruct the pathway and that he was acting in good faith.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the petitioner's act of parking his car on the common pathway did not amount to wrongful restraint under Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code. The court noted that the exception to Section 339, which allows for the obstruction of a private way in good faith, applied in this case. The court also found that the complainant's car was not obstructed by the petitioner's car, but rather by the common pathway itself.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner's act of parking his car on the common pathway amounted to wrongful restraint under Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Whether the exception to Section 339, which allows for the obstruction of a private way in good faith, applied in this case.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the petitioner's act of parking his car on the common pathway did not amount to wrongful restraint under Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code. The court reasoned that the exception to Section 339, which allows for the obstruction of a private way in good faith, applied in this case. The court also found that the complainant's car was not obstructed by the petitioner's car, but rather by the common pathway itself.
Final Decision: The court quashed the proceedings against the petitioner.
The Gauhati High Court quashed proceedings under Section 341 IPC against the petitioner for parking his car on a common ejmali passage, blocking the complainant's garage exit. (!) (!) [14000021330001] The court held this did not constitute wrongful restraint under Section 339 IPC, as no human body was obstructed, the pathway was common to both parties, and the good faith exception for obstructing a private way applied. (!) (!) [14000021330003][14000021330006] Revision allowed. (!)
1. This revision petition is directed for quashing the proceedings in G. R. Case No. 1718 of 1973 of the Court of Sri. R.N. Deb, Magistrate, 1st Class, Gauhati, which was started on the basis of a charge-sheet dated 10-6-1973 for the prosecution of petitioner under Section 341, Indian Penal Code.
2. The proceedings was initiated on the basis of a complaint by the opposite party No. 2 which reads as follows :-
"To
The Officer-in-Charge, Gauhati P.S.
Complainant :- Sri Narottamala Sharma.
M.S. Road, Fancy Bazar,
Gauhati.
The complainant begs to state that - We have got our own landed property at Murlidhar Sharma Road, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati and among our brothers there is one Ejmali passage. By the said ejmali passage our motor cars etc. come and go. In the interior we have got our motor garage also. The Fiat car standing in my name is inside the garage. My elder brother Shri Shankarlal Sharma has parked his car in the front by blocking the passage. My car has not been allowed to be taken out. For my urgent work it is most necessary to take out that car.
It is therefore proved that your honour will investigate into the matter immediately and after arranging for my taking out the car warn Shri Shankarlal Sharma to desist from such actions, 5-6-1973."
3. From the complaint petition it has to be seen whether there is any offence committed by the petitioner so as to bring the Criminal Court into motion, Section 339. Indian penal Code defines wrongful restraint which reads :
"Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception - The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this Section."
4. From the complaint petition it is quite clear that the Ejmali passage is the common path both for the complainant as well as for the petitioner. Therefore, Exception engrafted to the Section 339, Indian Penal Code is a clear provision where the petitioner believes in good faith that he has a lawful right to obstruct the way. Moreover, Section 339, I.P.C. occurs in Chapter 16 of the I.P.C. which deals with the offence against the human body. The complaint petition does not disclose that any human body is obstructed in this case. From the complaint petition it is clear that what is obstructed is obstruction to the car which is lying in the grange. In this particular case the passage is passage is a common path of all the brothers, the petitioner and the complaint, that is, the opposite party No. 2. Therefore, if in keeping the car by the petitioner on the pathway, there happens to be any obstruction in bringing out the car of the complainant from the garage, the complainant may have some other remedy but not the prosecution of the petitioner under Section 341, I.P.C. Moreover, in the complaint petition, there is only the prayer of making arrangement so that he can take out his car. The further prayer is for warning the petitioner from desisting from such action. I fail to understand how on these facts, the petitioner can be prosecuted. Under Section 341, I.P.C.
5. Mr. S.K. Ghose, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner draws my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1935 Cal 252 : (36 Cri LJ 740), Durga Pada Chatterjee v. Nilmani Ghose, where it was held that "the voluntary obstruction of a vehicle cannot be held to amount to wrongful restraint within the meaning of Section 339, I.P.C." In that case some carts loaded with paddy were obstructed by the accused persons and the accused persons did not allow the carts to proceed. On those facts prosecution was launched against the accused persons and they were convicted under Section 341, I.P.C. The High Court held that it was not a case under Section 339, I.P.C. in order to bring convictio
