A Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass ancillary orders, including an order for restoration of possession, after the final order under S. 145(6), Cr. P. C., and the successor Magistrate has the power to deal with such an application.

The petitioner questions the validity of an order passed by the Magistrate refusing to put the petitioner in possession of a disputed land, which was the subject matter of a dispute in a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. on the grounds that (1) the Court had "no seisin over the case" as such, it had no jurisdiction to make any order amending, adding or altering the final order which had been passed; and (2) this Court in Criminal Reference No. 25 of 1974 disposed of on 5-6-77 directed the parties to seek redress in Civil Court,

2. Mr. N. M. Dam, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is a reversible one, as the Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by law, vide S. 145 (6), Cr. P. C.

3-4. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of the points raised by the counsel for the petitioner may be summarised as follows:-

The petitioner was the initiator of a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. (old). A proceeding was drawn up in respect of the disputed land. The learned Magistrate directed attachment of the same but, however, receipt of a Police report to the effect that in a portion of the disputed land the members of the Second-party had forcibly occupied and constructed some structure the Magistrate directed attachment of the disputed land excepting the portion in which the second-party had been in possession by constructing their houses, The disputed land measures 4 Bighas and 18 Kathas. The learned Magistrate attached 4 bighas 12 kathas and 12 chataks of land. The portion which was not attached, but which remained all the same a part of the disputed land, was left out on the ground as mentioned above. The proceeding was drawn up on 13-2-1973 whereas the opposite parties had occupied or dispossessed the portion of the disputed land on 9-2-73. After following the procedure laid down under S. 145, Cr. P. C., on perusal of the relevant materials, the learned Magistrate held as under:-

"I, therefore, find and hold conclusively that it was the 1st party and 1st party alone who possessed the D/L at the relevant date of order on point of time as envisaged by the Section. I accordingly declare the possession of the 1st party over the D/L and further order that disturbance of such possession is strictly forbidden until the 1st party is evicted therefrom in due course of law.

Ask police to release the D/L in favour of the first party."

5. Therefore, it is indubitable that there was a final order in favour of the first-party declaring him in possession of the land and prohibiting the members of the second-party to disturb the possession of the 1st party. As such, on a perusal of the final order it appears clear that the final order covers the entire disputed land including the portion not attached during the course of the proceeding. It goes without saying that the learned Magistrate found the petitioner to be in actual physical possession of the attached land on the date of the drawal of the proceeding. The declaratory order of the learned Magistrate also indicates that the learned Magistrate held the occupation or dispossession made by the second-party on 9-2-73, to be wrongful and forcible and acting under the second proviso to Section 145 (4), Cr, P. C. treated the first-party so dispossessed as if the party had been in possession of that portion of the disputed land on the date of the initiation of the proceeding. At least, the declaration made by the trial Court spells out the said conclusion. No other version supports the aforesaid conclusion upheld by this Court as valid in Criminal Reference No. 25 of 1974. Therefore, I am constrained to hold that whether rightly or wrongly, the trial Court has held that the first-party was in possession of the entire disputed land on the date of the drawal of the proceeding and the same included the unattached portion of the disputed land.

6. However, the opposite parties questioned the validity of the said final order, including