A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 145(6) Cr.P.C. if the dispute is not such as one contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section 145 or if it cannot be resolved under sub-section (4) thereof. The Magistrate is required to examine the nature of the claims made by the parties in their written statements and to cancel the preliminary order passed under sub-section (1) if the dispute is not such as one contemplated under Section 145.

An order passed by the trial Court under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C. has been challenged in this case by the second party, who contested the proceedings in the Court below in his capacity as Chairman of a Collective Farming Co-operative Society.

2. This litigation has a long history to which I do not feel disposed to refer in detail. Suffice it to say that its life appears to begin with that of the aforesaid Society which was born in the year 1969-70 when a scramble ensued for securing allotment of a land of a de-reserved fishery. Nevertheless, I must also express my dismay, disappointment and concern for the unabated tendency of the litigants to take resort to the provisions of Sec. 145 Cr. P.C. and the failure of the Courts below in this state to appreciate the scope of the legal provisions and to respond adequately and appropriately to the situation. I had occasions, and indeed several, when, in dealing with similar applications I noticed this failure and I am reiterating my anxiety once again as I consider it to be the duty of the higher judiciary to condition the legal motivation of the subordinate Courts and endow them thereby with a direction and purpose to render justice according to law (see my recent judgment in Cri. Rev. No. 3/80. Henkholam v. Kadapti Tangkhul, decided on 21-8-84 : (reported in 1985 Cri LJ 1381). If delayed justice is a curse, it is the duty of the judiciary to apply itself honestly and vigorously to trace its causes and cast off its spell.

3. The immediate cause of initiation of the proceeding in the instant case was an application by the first party made on 5-11-1979 for passing an order under S. 144 Cr. P.C. against the second party and his men. The Police also recommended a proceeding to be drawn up under S. 144 Cr. P.C. against both the parties. But, the learned Magistrate, instead, passed an order on 7-12-1979, drawing up proceedings under S. 145 Cr. P.C, directing both parties to put in their respective statements of claim of actual possession of the disputed land. However, the proceeding eventually came to be dropped, but was surprisingly revived, pursuant to an order passed in revision by the learned Sessions Judge, who directed the proceeding to continue by allowing the first party's prayer for correction of the boundaries and the descriptions of the disputed land, which had been rejected by the trial Court.

4. A brief resume of either side's case pleaded in the trial Court may not be out of place. The first party, it may be mentioned, comprised of 25 petitioners, who described themselves as "landless persons" in their petition, stating that they had been possessing the disputed land measuring 25 paris under . Dag No. 2001, out of the dereserved area of Champrakhong Fishery, which they had reclaimed and were possessing without any obstruction from any quarter for the last 15 years. They also stated that they had applied for the allotment of the land at the rate of one pari each, but in the meantime, a Co-operative Society was formed, namely, the second party Society, which had also applied for allotment. After that what happened is a long history of the legal tussle between the parties to secure allotment in that allotment orders made by the authorities were challenged in this Court as also before the Revenue Tribunal and it is not necessary to refer thereto. However, the first party claimed that they had obtained a stay order from this Court, wherein they challenged an order dated 2-1-1979 passed by the Revenue Tribunal. However, the most significant aspect of the first party's written statement which must be noted is that they made a prayer for "confirmation of their possession of the disputed land" to which the learned Magistrate also referred in the impugned order. It is also recited in the order that the second party filed their written statement on 23-7-81, wherein they alleged that they were granted allotment of 200.20 acres of land covered by various Dags including Dag No. 2001 relatin