Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J.

1. This is an appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, arising out of the judgment and order, dated 25.11.2009, passed, in Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 2009, by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge (FTC No. 2), Kamrup, Guwahati, whereby the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has set aside the judgment and order, dated 29.06.2009, passed, in Complaint Case No. 8193(c)/2006, convicting the accused-respondent herein, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, 'NI Act') and sentencing him to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of 6(six) months and pay a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs, as compensation, within 3(three) months from the date of passing of the judgment. Consequent to the setting aside of the impugned judgment and order, dated 29.06.2009, of the learned trial Court, the accused-respondent, in terms of the subsequent judgment and order, dated 25.11.2009, which forms the subject matter of this appeal, stands acquitted.

2. I have heard Mr. A.K. Purkayastha, learned counsel, appearing for the complainant-appellant. None has appeared on behalf of the accused-respondent.

3. I have, however, heard Mr. R. Chakraborty, learned counsel, and Mr. R. Mazumdar, learned counsel, as amicus curiae.

4. While considering the present appeal, one needs to bear in mind the parameters of the powers of an appellate Court in dealing with a finding of acquittal recorded in favour of an accused.

5. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted that the scope of the appellate Court, in an appeal, arising out of acquittal, is distinct and different from the scope of an appellate court's power in an appeal arising out of conviction of an accused. The material distinction between the two is that it is possible for an appellate Court, while sitting in an appeal, arising out of conviction of an accused, to take a view, which is reasonable, but different from the view, which the trial Court may have taken; whereas a Court, while sitting in an appeal, arising out of acquittal, cannot take a view different from the decision of the Court, which has acquitted the accused, unless the appellate Court has reasons to take a view that the conclusion, which the Court, while acquitting the accused, had reached, is completely irrational or is based on a total misreading of the evidence on record leading to miscarriage of justice or is perverse in the sense that the finding of acquittal has been reached contrary to the weight of the evidence on record or on a misconception of law.

6. In short, thus, interference with the judgment of acquittal is possible only when the view, which the Court, while acquitting an accused has taken, is found to be wholly irrational and unacceptable. When two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, it is permissible for a Court, while sitting in an appeal, arising out of conviction, to take a view different from the one, which may have been taken by the trial Court. On the other hand, while sitting on an appeal against acquittal, a Court would not interfere with the finding of acquittal if there were, on the basis of the evidence on record, two views reasonably possible. Interference, with a finding of acquittal, is permissible only when the conclusion, which has been reached by the trial Court, while acquitting an accused, is such, which a rational mind cannot agree to, or where the conclusion, as regards acquittal, was reached by ignoring the evidence on record or wholly contrary to the evidence on record or on misconception of law or on the basis of inadmissible pieces of evidence and/or the law relevant thereto.

7. What is also of immense importance to note, while considering an appeal against the acquittal, is that an accused is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty and an order of acquittal bolsters this presumption and strengthens thereby the case of the accused that he is innocent. (See Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh & Ors. Vs. S