The main legal point established in the judgment is that a partnership firm stood dissolved on and from a certain date, rendering any suit filed by the non-existent partnership firm and the application for temporary injunction not maintainable. Additionally, the judgment clarified that a person with permitted user rights has no right to institute any proceeding for infringement.

H. Baruah, J.

1. In challenge is the order dated 9-12-2009 passed by District Judge, Jorhat in Misc, (J) Case No. 178 of 2008 arising out of Title Suit No. 3 of 2008 filed by the appellants herein as plaintiff's whereby and whereunder the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 135of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 has been dismissed.

2. As it appears the application as indicated above has been primarily dismissed on two grounds, namely:

(i) dissolution of the partnership firm; and

(ii) for want of jurisdiction.

3. The appellants being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned order have preferred this appeal on various grounds among others the following:

(i) that the learned District Judge, Jorhat erred in law as well as in facts in rejecting the application holding the same not maintainable;

(ii) that the learned District Judge, Jorhat committed error in holding that the District Judge at Jorhat does not have jurisdiction under Section134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The learned District Judge also committed error in holding that no cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the court for want of passing off the materials. Section134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 creates an additional jurisdiction to the plaintiff to file a suit at the place they reside, carry on business or work for gain in addition to the jurisdiction provided under the code of Civil Procedure and there being infringement of trade mark and passing off at Jorhat due to sale of the products with the identical trade mark and identical package, cause of action having arisen at Jorhat, the court at Jorhat has jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned District Judge while passing the impugned order did not consider this aspect of the matter and accordingly passed the impugned order erroneously and illegally, which deserves to be set aside and quashed;

(iii) that the respondent No. 2 being the resident at Jorhat and the offending goods being distributed by her manufactured by defendant No. 1 with deceptive identical trade mark, the court at Jorhat has jurisdiction to try the suit and the finding of the learned District Judge that jurisdiction is doubtful is absolutely incorrect and for that the impugned order dated 9-12-2009 is also liable to be set aside;

(iv) that the appellants having been using the trade mark "Bandar Dholak Chhap" since 1986 and there being an agreement for use of the trade mark with the respondent No. 3, which prompted the appellants to withdraw the application for registration and the judgment of the Delhi High Court, which refused grant of injunction against the appellants on the application of respondent No. 3, these facts having not been considered by the learned District Judge, the findings of the learned District Judge that the appellants have failed to establish a prima facie case are erroneous and illegal;

(v) that the learned District Judge also committed error and illegality In applying the provision of Section 43 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999;

(vi) that the learned District Judge also failed to consider the constitution of the partnership firm with effect from 21st June, 2008, Thus, finding that the suit is not maintainable Inasmuch as at the time of filing the suit and the application, no partnership firm was existent under the name and style "M/s. Ravindra &. Co." is erroneous. Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 specially provides for reliefs which court can grant. Injunction is one of them and the defendant respondent No. 2 having not denied the sale of the products in identical trade marks at Jorhat, the balance of convenience is in favour of the appellants. The appellants for such sale suffer from irreparable loss and injury and loss of good will. The learned District Judge, while passing the Impugned order failed not take into consideration of these facts and also the law and erroneously refused to grant injunction;

(vii) that the learned District Judge also failed to consider the pa