A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be cured even by consent of parties.

H. Baruah, J.

1. Heard Mr. P.C. Prusty, learned Counsel for the Appellant as well as Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. T. J. Lalnuntluanga, learned Counsel for the Respondents.

2. The judgment and order dated 24-2-2011 is put in challenge in this instant appeal whereby and whereunder the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Aizawl granted a succession certificate in favour of the Petitioners therein, the Respondents herein in respect of landed property and a building standing thereon covered under LSC No. AZL-741 of 1979.

3. The Respondents herein jointly filed an application under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for a succession certificate in respect of the landed property and with the building thereon covered under LSC No. AZL-741 of 1979 left by their deceased father Dal Bahadur Chhetri, who died intestate at his permanent residence at Maubawk, Aizawl. The aforesaid application was resisted by the Appellant herein stating inter alia therein that her deceased husband Mohan Chhetri was the only surviving son and inherited the property of his late father Dal Bahadur Chhetri. Said Dal Bahadur Chhetri was the son of Gaibir Chhetri, a permanent resident of Maubawk, Aizawl. He died intestate on 8-7-2001. He was predecessed by his wife. He left behind his son Mohon Chhetri and two daughters, namely, Pompha Chetri and Mala Chhetri. Said Dal Bahadur Chhetri died leaving no Will nor bequeathed his landed property to anybody.

4. The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aizawl taking into consideration of the facts and the other materials on record granted succession certificate in respect of the landed property and the building thereon covered under LSC No. AZL-741 of 1979 left by Dal Bahadur Chhetri.

5. Mr. P.C. Prustry, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant strenuously argues that the impugned judgment and order cannot sustain in law since the same was passed by a court, which does not have jurisdiction to grant a succession certificate in respect of landed property. It is submitted by Mr. P.C. Prusty, learned counsel for the Appellant that succession certificate would only be available to the Appellant(s) in respect of debt and security left by the deceased and the court would not have jurisdiction to grant succession certificate in respect of immovable property. Mr. Prusty in support of his contention relies in the decision rendered in the case between Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and Ors. v. Ravinder Nath and Ors. reported in (2008) 2 SCC 350. In para-25 the Apex court held as under:

25. The Court then proceeded to rely on Bahrein Petroleum Company Ltd. V. P.J. Pappu and observed in para 32 that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. The Court further observed that: (Harshad Chiman Las Case, SCC p. 804, Para 32)

32. ...It is well settled and needs no authority that where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing'. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice.

6. In the case between Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 244; the Apex court also adopted the same view. In paragraph-19, the Apex Court held as under:

19. We, however, while taking that facto into consideration must p lace on record that we are not oblivious of the fact that a decision rendered without jurisdiction would be coram non judice. Objection in regard to jurisdiction may be taken at any stage. See Chief Engineer, Hydel Project v. Ravinder Nath, wherein inter alia the decision of this Court in Kiram Singh v. Chaman Paswan was followed, stating: (Ravinder case, SCC p. 361 para 26