IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
JASTI CHELAMESWAR AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.
Commissioner of Income Tax – Appellant
Vs.
Williamson Tea (Assam) Ltd. (formerly George Williamson (Assam) Ltd.) – Respondent
Assessment Year: 2000-2001
Decided On : 28.10.2009
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 96 and Section 100 - Orders 41 and 42 - Rule 3A - Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 253 and 260A (7) - Indian Companies Act - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 and 29 (2) - Central Excise Act, 1944 - Section 35H(1) - Income Tax - Preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present application - Condone the delay - Respondent is that provisions of the Income Tax Act in so far as appeals and revisions under Act are concerned are a complete code in themselves prescribing various aspects of appeals and revisions such as forum procedure and limitation and it is not permissible in background of such a situation to place reliance upon provisions of Limitation Act - Provisions of Central Excise Act, which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in said case, are not in pari materia with the provisions of the Income Tax Act dealing with the appeals to High Court and secondly that a Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court reported in CIT v. Velingkar Brothers [2007] 289 ITR 382 on a consideration of relevant provisions of Income Tax Act came to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings under Section 260A of Income Tax act – Held, Underlying presumption under rule 3A is that High Court entertaining the appeal under Section 100 or 96 or other court entertaining appeals under Section 96 has requisite legal authority of condoning delay in presenting appeal, a presumption based on the express language of Section 5 read with Part II of the First Schedule to Limitation Act - Therefore, submission of learned Counsel for the applicant that Sub-section (7) of Section 260A of Income Tax Act read with rule 3A, Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code - On other hand, a later Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in a judgment dated in Income Tax Appeal (L) No. 3592/08 CIT v. Grasim Industries Limited [2009] 319 ITR 154 had an occasion to consider both abovementioned two decisions of Full Bench of Bombay High Court as well as Supreme Court in the context of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 260A of Income Tax Act and came to conclusion that High Court cannot resort to Section 5 of Limitation Act for condoning delay in admitting an appeal delayedly presented under Section 260A of Income Tax Act - Consequently, the appeal stands rejected.
J. Chelameswar, C.J.
1. Heard Mr. U. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the applicant.
2. This application is filed praying that the delay of 290 days in filing an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, against the order dated August 31, 2007, passed in I.T.A. No. 44 (Gauhati)/2004 and in I.T.A. No. 51(Gauhati)/2004 for the assessment year 2000-01 be condoned. The application is filed by the Revenue invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. The respondent is served, represented by Dr. A.K. Saraf, learned senior counsel.
4. When the matter is taken up today Dr. A.K. Saraf, learned senior Counsel raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present application. The learned Counsel argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to the appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. The power conferred upon the courts by virtue of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay, if any, in presenting either an appeal or an application is not available to this court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act.
5. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the provisions of the Income Tax Act in so far as appeals and revisions under the Act are concerned, are a complete code in themselves prescribing various aspects of appeals and revisions such as the forum, the procedure and the limitation and it is not permissible in the background of such a situation to place reliance upon the provisions of the Limitation Act.
6. The learned Counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 (SC) in support of his submission. Further, the learned Counsel brought to the notice of the court that the abovementioned decision of the Supreme Court was also followed in another order of the Supreme Court made in Civil Appeal No. 5389/07 Chaudharana Steels P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2009] 238 ELT 705 (SC).
7. On the other hand, Mr. U. Bhuyan, learned Counsel for the applicant/appellant argued, firstly, that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 is distinguishable for the reason that the provisions of the Central Excise Act, which fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in the said case, are not in pari materia with the provisions of the Income Tax Act dealing with the appeals to High Court and, secondly, that a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in CIT v. Velingkar Brothers [2007] 289 ITR 382 on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act came to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act.
8. To arrive at a conclusion on the above issue we are of the opinion that the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 is required to be examined. The question which fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in the abovementioned case was whether a reference application under Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as it existed on the date relevant to the appeal could be presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the abovementioned Section invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. One of the submissions before the Supreme Court was that in view of the language of Section 29 Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the exclusion of the applicability of the pro visions of the Limitation Act is permissible only in those cases where there is an express declaration in any special or local law to that effect. Since the Central Excise Act (no doubt a special enactment) does not contain any such express provision of exclusion of the application of S
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