I.A. Ansari, J.

1. Whether a statement, which is popularly known as 'disclosure statement', must be reduced into writing in order to make such a statement admissible in evidence, under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is the question, which this reference has to answer.

2. The material facts, which have led to this reference, may, in brief, be set out as under:

(i) In Pandav Koya v. State of Assam reported in 2006 (1) GLT 267, a Division Bench of this Court took the view that Section27 of the Evidence Act would not be applicable if the accused person's statement, which is alleged to have led to the discovery of a fact, has not been reduced into writing.

(ii) In Anup Nath and Ors. v. State of Assam reported in 2008 (1) GLT 255 : 2008 Cri LJ (NOC) 605, another Division Bench, however, took the view that Section 27 of the Act will not cease to be applicable merely because of the fact that the disclosure statement, made by the accused, has not been reduced into writing.

(iii) Yet another Division Bench, in Alphus Munda and Ors. v. State of Assam reported in 1996 (3) GLT 568, had held that Section 27 does not make it mandatory that the information, given by an accused to the police, be reduced into writing.

(iv) In Tazuddin Barbhuyan and Anr. v. State of Assam reported in 2004 (3) GLT 97, too a Division Bench held that Section 27 does not require recording of statement and that even the oral information, given by an accused to the police, which may lead to discovery of a fact, is admissible in evidence. In this regard, the Division Bench, in Tazuddin Barbhuyan (supra), also referred to the case of Alphus Munda (supra).

(v) On noticing that the decision, in Pandav Koya (supra), inns contrary to the decision in Alphus Munda (supra), a Division Bench, in Joyram Ingty v. State of Assam reported in 2006 (4) GLT 33, pointed out that the decision, in Alphus Munda (supra), had not been brought to the notice of the Division Bench in Pandav Koya (supra) and that the conflict of views, expressed in the said two decisions, is required to be resolved, in an appropriate case, by a larger Bench.

(vi) Having noted, during the course of hearing of Criminal Appeal No. 45/2005 Rajiv Phukan v. State of Assam that there is conflict of views, in this High Court on the question as to whether Section 27 of the Evidence Act will or will not be attracted if an accused person's statement, which claims to have led to the discovery of a fact, has not been reduced into writing, a Division Bench, has referred the matter to a larger Bench. In terms of the reference so made, this Full Bench has been constituted to resolve the controversy.

3. We have heard Mr. P. Bora, learned Counsel, for the appellant, and Mr. Z. Kumar, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam.

4. The question as to whether a 'disclosure statement' must be reduced into writing in order to make such a statement admissible in evidence, under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, cannot be correctly answered unless one takes into account not only the provisions embodied in Section 27, but also the provisions contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Sections 25, 26 and 27 are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow:

25. Confession to police officer not to be proved. No confession, made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him.— No confession made by any person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.

27. How much information received from accused may be proved. Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.

5. A bare reading of