The main legal point established in the judgment is that a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act can be made by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, and when a firm is a complainant, the complaint must be made through a natural person authorized to represent the firm in legal proceedings.

H.N. Sarma, J.

1. Legality and validity of the appellate judgment and order dated 25.4.07 passed in Case No. 2867c/2000; 2868c/2000 and 2869c/2000 thereby affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence imposed upon the petitioner by the learned trial court in case No. 17,18 and 19/2004 is the subject matter of challenge in this batch of revision petition. The impugned judgment having been passed analogously and the learned Counsel having been agreed for disposal by a common judgment, these revision petitions are heard analogously and disposed of by this common judgment.

2. I have heard Mr. GP Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the accused/petitioner and Mr. A. Bora, learned Counsel who enters appearance on behalf of the complainant/respondent.

3. The complainant/respondent is a proprietorial firm and authorized dealer of BPL, Telecom Ltd. Products for the North East Region. During the course of business transaction, the accused petitioner being liable to pay certain amount to the complainant, the petitioner issued three different cheques from his existing account of the State Bank of India, Nagaon Branch on different dates i.e., on 15.6.2000 for Rs. 15,000/-; 20.7.2000 for Rs. 15,000/- and on 25.7.2000 for Rs. 12,257/- only. The cheques were drawn in the name of the complainant, M/s. Xinmin. The aforesaid cheque, being presented in the bank, were dishonoured by the bank. Thereupon complying with the necessary requirements relating to issuance of prior demand notice under Section 138 of the NI Act, these complaint cases were filed against the petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

4. The learned trial court conducting the proceeding as per law, vide judgment and order dated 25.4.07 convicted the accused/petitioner under Section 138 of the NI Act in all the three cases and sentenced him to pay a compensation Rs. 30,000/- in default to suffer S.I. for six months in Case No. 2867(C)/2000, to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000/- and in default to suffer S.I. for six months in Case No. 2868(C)/2000 and to pay a fine of Rs. 24,000/- and in default to suffer S.I. for six months in Case No. 2869c/2000. It was further directed that if the fine is realized, be paid to the complainant as compensation. All the three complaint cases were disposed of by the aforesaid common judgment by the learned trial court i.e., Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate Guwahati.

5. Being aggrieved, the aforesaid judgment was carried into appeals being Criminal Ap peals No. 17, 18 and 19 of 2004 in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati. The learned appellate court vide common judgment and order dated 20.6.08 maintained the conviction imposed by the learned trial court upon the petitioner but modified the sentence to the effect that the accused/petitioner is to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default S.I. for three months and to pay a compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the complainant in Criminal Appeal No. 27/08, to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default S.I. for three months and to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the complainant in Criminal Appeal No. 28/07 and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default S.I. for three months and to pay compensation of Rs. 19,000/- to the complainant in Criminal Appeal No'. 29/07. It was further directed that upon realization of fine and compensation, the same shall be paid to the complainant. Challenging the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned appellate court, a present criminal petitions have been filed by the aggrieved accused.

6. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the petitioner, during the course of hearing, has raised the only issue to the effect that the complaint is not maintainable inasmuch as the same has not been filed by the persons aggrieved who should be or holder in due course but in fact it was filed by the Manager of the concerned firm who does not fall within the said categories and on that count alone the impugned judgment and orders are liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel contends that u