The main legal point established in the judgment is that 'stone' is not a forest produce within the meaning of the Assam Forest Regulation, and therefore, the authorities cannot insist for Transit Pass and Transit Challans for stone processed in the crushing units.

H.N. Sarma, J.

1. This batch of writ petitions having given raise to a common question for adjudication and as prayed for by the learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties, all the petitions are heard analogously and disposed of by this common judgment.

2. Heard Mr. T.C. Khatri, learned Senior counsel, Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Senior counsel, Mr. D. Mazumdar, Mr. P.J. Saikia, Mr. D. Das and other learned Counsel appearing for the respective writ petitioners. Also heard Mr. R.K. Bora and Ms. R. Chakraborty learned Additional Senior Government Advocate appearing for the official respondents.

3. The basic challenge made in this batch of writ petitions is the jurisdiction and competence of the respondents/authorities to insist for Transit Pass and Transit Challans under the provision of Section 40 of the Assam Forest Regulation to the petitioners in respect of the stone which is being processed in the crushing units, operated by them.

4. The essential facts necessary for disposal of these writ petitions which is common to all the petitions, are that the petitioners are operating stone crushing units in their respective area on the basis of permit issued by the respondents/authorities. The purpose of setting up of this stone crushing units are for crushing stones taken from different forest mahals from the respective lessee/mahaldar and/or from the private persons. After transforming such stones/bowlders into the desired sizes after crushing in their crushing machines, the products are supplied to the different persons for selling in the market. Such permits to establish stone crushing units have been granted by the authorities in terms of the provisions contained in the Notification No. FRM 152/2001/54 dated 29th January, 2003 issued by the Principal Secretary, department of Forest, State of Assam. The aforesaid notification lays down the various provision regarding issuance of such licence to set up stone crushing unit and the necessary requirement thereof. Clause 17 of the said Notification, it is provided that any type of stone entering or leaving the premises of the Stone Crusher Unit shall be governed by TP and Transit Challan duly issued under the provision of rules. On the basis of the aforesaid enabling clause, the officials of the Forest Department are insisting for TP and Transit Challan from the petitioners in respect of the stone chips, produced in their crushing units. It is the case of the petitioners that the stone not being a forest produce within the meaning of law, the authorities are not empowered to insist for such TP and Transit Challans. Against the aforesaid action of the State authorities demanding such documents, the present batch of writ petition has been filed.

5. Contesting the petition a counter has been filed in WP (C) No. 3485/2007. It is submitted by Mr. Bora, learned State counsel that the stand taken in the aforesaid counter is the stand of the State Government in all the cases. The respondents contend that the propriety for insisting for such TP and Transit Challans has been made clear by the Notification mentioned above under which licences were issued to the petitioners allowing to set up the stone crushing unit. That apart, taking note of the meaning of the word "stone" and referring to the Assam Minor Mineral Concessions Rules, 1994 as well as Section 3(4)(b)(iv) of the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, it is submitted that 'stone' falls within the definition of 'forest produce'. Accordingly, the officials of the Forest Department are empowered to demand TP and Transit Challans in exercise of their right to regulate the transit of forest produce within the State.

6. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.

7. In the backdrop of what has been noted above, now let me consider and examine the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners as to whether the 'stone' falls within the definition of forest produce as defined und