The detaining authority must inform the detenu of their right to make representation to the State and/or Central Government and to the Advisory Board. The detaining authority must have valid material to support the detention order and must reveal what materials were considered. Discharge or acquittal in a criminal case is not irrelevant and must be taken into account before passing a detention order.

I.A. Ansari, J.

1. By an order, dated 14.2.2006, passed, under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (in short, 'the NSA, 1980'), the District Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, has placed the Petitioner in preventive detention. This order of detention was made pursuant to a report submitted by the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala. The Petitioner was, on 14.2.2006, served with the order of detention along with the grounds on which the detention order was made and his order of detention has been approved by the State Government on 20.2.2006. Aggrieved by his detention, the Petitioner has challenged the same by making this application, under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Respondents to release the Petitioner from detention.

2. We have heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. P.K. Biswas learned Asst. Solicitor General, appearing for the Union of India. We have also heard Mr. S. Chakraborty learned Counsel for the State of Tripura.

3. While considering the present writ petition, what needs to be borne in mind that the Constitution makes it mandatory for the High Courts and also the Supreme Court to zealously guard against the abuse of the liberty of persons by the State. While exercising this constitutional obligation the High Court may not be unmindful of the harmful consequences of the activities, which a detenu may be alleged to have been involved in. While, however, discharging the constitutional obligation to enforce the fundamental rights of a person, more particularly, when the right relates to his personal liberty, the Court cannot allow itself to be influenced by the conditions, which had led to the passing of an order of preventive detention against such a person and ignore, under such influence, the denial of the rights, which the Constitution and the laws enacted confer on such a detenu. Observed the Supreme Court, in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 51:

We are not unmindful of the harmful consequences of the activities in which the detenus are alleged to be involved. But while discharging our constitutional obligation to enforce the fundamental rights of the people, more specifically, the right to personal liberty, we cannot allow ourselves to be influenced by these considerations.

4. We cannot overlook the fact that the preventive detention is a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty. When such a momentous power was given to the executive, the framers of the Constitution ensured that certain minimum safeguards be provided to detenu in order to ensure that his personal liberty is not violated except in accordance with law. No wonder, therefore, that the Supreme Court reminds all of us. In Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel (Supra), that history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards and the minimum safeguards, which are provided under Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of activities alleged against a detenu. From the observations made in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that though detention of a person may be required in the interest of the State, the fact remains that since the preventive detention affects the liberty of the person detained, the mandatory requirements of the procedural safeguards provided by law to the detenu must be scrupulously followed and complied with and if the same is not done, the High Court would be duty bound to step in and set right the wrong, which the detention order inflicts on the detenu in violation of his valuable rights conferred by Article 22 and the laws enacted thereunder.

5. Reiterated the Supreme Court, in Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardas Patel (supra), its earlier views in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 (at page 483), that the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safegua