The main legal point established is that in a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, if the defendant has been put in possession following a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C., the plaintiff's remedy lies in instituting a suit under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act or seeking a declaration of his rights under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

I.A. Ansari, J.

1. This revision is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 20.9.2003, passed, in Title Suit No. 15/2001, by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 3, Guwahati, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner.

2. The case of the plaintiff-petitioner may, in brief, be described, thus: The plaintiff has been in possession of a plot of land measuring about 2 Kathas, described in Schedule A to the plaint, since 1968. The land measuring about 7 Lechas, described in Schedule B to the plaint, forms a part of the land of Schedule A. The land of the plaintiff and that of the defendant are located contiguous to each other and, while the plaintiff's land is a plot of government land, the land owned and possessed by the defendant is a patta land. By making false accusations against the plaintiff of his having made attempts to dispossess the defendant from the land of Schedule B, the defendant instituted a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C., and got, on 12.9.1997, the land of Schedule B attached under Section 146 Cr.P.C., this proceeding having given rise to Misc. Case No. 503/97. The plaintiff filed a written statement, in the said proceeding, clarifying that the land, claimed to have fallen under Dag No. 90 of Kachha Patta No. 6 by the defendant, is not a government land and that the land, which has been attached, is a separate piece of land. However, by order, dated 10.1.2001, passed in Misc. Case No. 503/97 aforementioned, possession of the said attached land was declared in favour of the defendant and, acting on the directions issued by the learned Executive Magistrate, the police handed over the possession of the land of Schedule B to the defendant, though the land of Schedule B has never been in the possession of the defendant. Having received the possession of the land of Schedule B, the defendant constructed a boundary wall around the land of Schedule B and blocked thereby entry to the said plot of land by the plaintiff, though the plaintiff had been using the said piece of land, in the past, for the purpose of his entry into, and exit from, his house to the main road.

3. On conclusion of the trial, as the impugned decree was passed dismissing the suit, the plaintiff is, now, before this Court, with the help of the present Revision.

4. I have heard Mr. D.C. Mahanta, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, and Mr. P.K. Deka, learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party.

5. Presenting the case on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, Mr. D.C. Mahanta, learned senior counsel, has submitted that in the present case, the plaintiff's suit, instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, was for recovery of possession of the land of Schedule B by evicting the defendant therefrom. In the face of the case set up by the plaintiff, the learned trial court ought to have, points out Mr. Mahanta, held an enquiry into the question as to whether the land of Schedule B had been in possession of the plaintiff, as claimed by him, and whether the plaintiff had been dispossessed by the defendant from the said government land, (which is described in Schedule B) otherwise than in due course of law. No such enquiry, according to Mr. Mahanta, was ever made by the learned trial court and in the absence of any finding, in this regard, the suit was dismissed, which is, contends Mr. Mahanta, wholly illegal and warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its reversional jurisdiction.

6. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, Mr. P.K. Deka, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the defendant-opposite party, submits that the specific finding of the learned trial court is that the land, which was a subject-matter of the proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C., is the land, which has been described in Schedule B to the plaint, and since the defendant has been put in possession of this plot of land in accordance with the provisions of law contain