The main legal point established in the judgment is that a Debt Recovery Tribunal is a creation of Entry 45 of List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and not a creation under Article 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution, allowing the decision of the Tribunal to be adjudicated by a single Judge of the High Court through a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

R.B. Misra, J.

1. Heard Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N. Majumder, learned Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Chowdhury, learned Counsel for the respondent.

2. The short question for consideration before this Court is as to whether the Division Bench or Single Bench of the High Court could hear the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal (in short 'the Tribunal').

3. The above question has arisen for consideration in reference to an order dated 31-3-2004 passed by the Tribunal, Guwahati in Original Application No. 233 of 1997 where the petitioner was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 34,32,769,73 with interest to the respondent/State Bank of India, Agartala Bazar Branch, Agartala.

4. Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner while inviting our attention to a decision of this Court dated 6-12-2000 in W.P. (C) No. 527 of 2000 has submitted that Debt Recovery Tribunal is a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 323-B of the Constitution and, therefore, in view of the Order dated 6-12-2000 of this Court as indicated above only Division Bench of the High Court could entertain the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. To strengthen his contention Mr. Das, in reference to the decision of the Supreme Court passed in [1997] 228 ITR 725 (SC), L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, paragraphs 92 and 99 has asserted that the Tribunal created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules and all decisions of the Tribunal be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction such Tribunal concerned falls. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the decision and order of the Tribunal, party could move to the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and against the decision of Division Bench of the High Court aggrieved party could move before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution by way of special leave petition. According to Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Chandrakumar (supra) as referred and relied on by Mr. B. Das, has no application in the present case inasmuch as the Debt Recovery Tribunal is not a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution. According to Mr. Deb, the question whether a Debt Recovery Tribunal is one within the meaning of Article 323-B was examined by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association, [2002] 2 SCR 450 wherein, correctness of the decision of Delhi High Court and Gauhati High Court also came for consideration and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a Debt Recovery Tribunal is a creature of legislature under Entry 45 of List I of the VII Schedule of the Constitution and as such is not a 'Tribunal' created within the meaning of Article 323B.

5. According to Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel for the respondent, the decision of the Tribunal in question does not fall within Article 323-B of the Constitution and therefore, shall be brought under scrutiny by a Single Judge of High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Mr. Deb has further contended that the decision of this Court dated 6-12-2000 passed in W.P.(C) No. 527 of 2000 was without examining the issue in the above perspective and the said decision was passed without considering the question whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal was one within the meaning of Article 323-B or whether it was an independent legislation created by the legislature in exercise of the power under Entry 45 of List I of the VII Schedule of the Constitution.

6. When this issue arose befor