The law of limitation should be applied with rigor and equitable considerations are not relevant when construing the provision pertaining to limitation.

A.M. Saikia, J.

1. Heard Mr. D. Sur, learned counsel for the petitioner. The notice upon the sole Respondent is presumed to be complete in view of the Registry's order dated 23.2.2005. None appears for the Respondent.

2. By this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the applicant has sought for condonation of delay of 176 days in preferring the related MPA No. 115/04.

3. In the case in hand, the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Nagaon in W.C. Case No. 104/02 rendered the impugned judgment and award on 9.2.2004 awarding a compensation of Rs. 1,64,640 (Rupees one lakh sixty-four thousand six hundred and forty) only against the petitioner. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order, the petitioner has filed the related appeal on 25.8.2004 thereby causing delay of 176 days as the limitation period of 60 days since expired on 9.4.2004.

4. Such delay has been explained in paragraph 3 of this application and the same may be extracted as under :

"That the applicant/appellant begs to state that the Learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Nagaon vide order dated 9.2.2004 passed the award and judgment order. That from the date of judgment limitation period of 60 days expires on 9.4.2004 that means there is delay of only 176 days in filing the MFA Appeal against the judgment and order dated 9.4.2004. The delay in filing the MFA Appeal was due to the making of official procedures after received of certified copy from its branch office at Nagaon, thereafter making official correspondence from its subordinate branch and taking advocate's legal advices/opinion that caused the certain official procedural delay."

5. A bare perusal of the explanation as noticed above abundantly shows that the delay has not been reasonably, satisfactorily or properly explained to satisfy the Court to condone the delay in question. It is established that the Court should be liberal in condoning the delay in filing an Appeal/Petition/Application but such delay is inexcusable unless sufficient cause is shown.

6. Mr. Sur, learned counsel for the applicant has forcefully argued that the delay occurred due to following the official formalities and procedures as for filing an Appeal of such nature, it is required to be routed through its respective branch office in order to reach the head office which has the final say as to whether the appeal should be preferred or not on the legal advice/opinion of its Advocate. Accordingly time has been taken for making official correspondences and hence there is no laches or negligence on the part of the petitioner. Besides, it is also argued that the applicant being a Public Sector Undertaking carrying on general insurance business involving public money, considering hardship to be faced by the petitioner some lenient view needs to be taken for condonation of such delay in preferring the connected appeal against the impugned award wherein the petitioner has been directed to pay the compensation amount as mentioned hereinabove.

7. Law of limitation does not envisage that when an application seeking condonation of delay is field by the Govt. or any other authority, the Court must invariably condone the delay regardless of whether sufficient cause is shown or not. If sufficient cause is, prima facie, not found in the application seeking condonation of delay, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the petition. Consideration of hardship and equitable consideration are out of place when construing the provision pertaining to limitation inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran's case (P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in : 1997 ECR 785 (SC) ) in paragraph 6 held as follows :

"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with on its rigour when the statute so prescribed and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds...."

8. For the reasons and discussion above, this Court is of