The language of the tariff and judicial discipline require the court to follow the decision laid down by the Division Bench, and an unpublished resolution cannot determine the liability of a consumer to payment of a different tariff.

Ranjan Gogoi, J.

1. The controversy in the present writ petition relates to the question as to whether the Tea Manufacturing Unit of the petitioner without a garden/plantation is to be included within Category 8 or Category 6 of the 1994 Schedule of Tariff framed by the A.S.E.B. under Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. The aforesaid formulation with regard to the scope of the writ petition has been made by the Court having regard to the specific reliefs prayed for in the writ petition. Though a valiant attempt has been made on behalf of the petitioner to extend the horizons of the writ petition to cover the entitlement of the petitioner for the categorisation under the subsequent Schedule of Tariffs, this Court is of the view that having regard to the prayers made, the scope and ambit of the writ petition should not be extended to the areas as contended by the writ petitioner.

2. The point formulated above, will have to be reconciled on the basis of the language used by the Board while framing Category 8 of the 1994 Schedule of Tariff. Categorisation of consumers of electricity for the purpose of payment of tariff has been broadly made on the basis of the use to which electricity is put to by the consumer. While under the 1994 Schedule of Tariff, the criteria of applicability to bring a particular pattern of consumption within a defined category has not been spelt out, in the erstwhile tariff of 1986, there is an exhaustive enumeration of the criteria of applicability. Category 8 of the 1994 Schedule of tariff merely lays down the tariff applicable to "Tea, Coffee and Rubber" whereas under the corresponding category, i.e., Category 9 of the 1986 Schedule of Tariff, in what circumstances the supply of power for Tea, Coffee and Rubber would fall under Category 9 has been spelt out in details. However, in the 1994 Schedule of Tariff, it is clearly mentioned that the tariff prescribed is in suppression of the prevailing tariff and shall be applicable to the respective categories of consumers mentioned in the 1986 Schedule of Tariff.

The aforesaid Category 9 as included in the relevant Schedule of Tariff, 1986 may be usefully extracted hereunder :

"CATEGORY : 9

Supply for Tea, Coffee and Rubber Gardens.

1. APPLICABILITY -

Applicable to supply taken by Tea, Coffee and Rubber gardens only for their factory consumptions, Irrigation and other consumptions in the Estate."

3. Mrs. S. Kejriwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Category 8 of the 1994 Schedule of Tariff, must be understood to be pari materia with that of Category 9 of the erstwhile 1986 Schedule of Tariff. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on an unreported judgment of this Court passed in the case of Teamafeo Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board and Ors. (Writ Appeal No. 248 of 1993) has submitted that a similar question as raised in the present writ petition, under the 1986 Schedule of Tariff, had arisen for consideration before the Division Bench in the above case. The Division Bench on an elaborate consideration of the contentions advanced by the rival parties and the terms of the 1986 Schedule of Tariff had come to the conclusion that a unit manufacturing tea but without a tea garden would be more appropriately classifiable under Category 6 of the 1986 Schedule of Tariff instead of Category 9. Mrs. S. Kejriwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has contended that Category 8 of 1994 Schedule of Tariff being same and similar with the Category of the 1986 Schedule Tariff, the issue raised in the present writ petition would stand covered by the decision of the Division Bench, as noted above.

4. Mr. H. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Board has not seriously disputed that Category 8 of the 1994 Schedule of Tariff would correspond to Category 9 of the 1986 Schedule. However, learned counsel by placing reliance the resolution dated 22.11.1996 taken by the Board has sought to contend that it has