The main legal point established in the judgment is that the word 'employer' in the third proviso to Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act does not include the word 'insurer', and the 'insurer' does not always step into the shoes of the 'employer'. The court emphasized the distinction between the liabilities of the 'insurer' and the 'employer' under the Act.

I.A. Ansari, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. These appeals have been resisted, at the very threshold, by challenging their maintainability on a question, which is, though short, a question of considerable importance. The moot question raised is this : Whether the Insurance Company (for convenience, hereinafter referred to as 'insurer'), which prefers an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (for short, the WC Act), is required to deposit the amount awarded as contemplated under the third proviso to Section 30 of the WC Act ?

3. For the sake of brevity, Sub-section (1) of Section 30 is reproduced, in its entirety, hereinbelow : -

"30 Appeals - (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely -

(a) an order as awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;

(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A;

(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workmen, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;

(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or

(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions :

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees.

Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties.

Provided further that no appeal by an 'employer' under Clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.

4. A perusal of Section 30 indicates that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against various types of orders as described under Sections 30(1)(a), (aa), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Act. It is significant to note that Section 30 does not indicate as to who can prefer an appeal; but the third proviso is directly relatable to the point at issue. The proviso is very specific to the effect that no appeal by an 'employer' against an order under Clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.

5. The real question, therefore, raised is this : Whether the word 'employer', appearing in the third proviso to Section 30, shall include 'insurer' meaning thereby that for an appeal preferred by an 'insurer' to be maintainable, whether the 'insurer' too shall, same as the 'employer', deposit with the Commissioner, before the appeal is preferred, the amount payable under the order appealed against and the memorandum of appeal preferred before the High Court has to be accompanied by a certificate issued by the Commissioner under the WC Act to the effect that appellant-'insurer' has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.

6. On the questions raised above, divergent views have been expressed by various High Courts. No decision of the Supreme Court, on the questions, which have so arisen for determination, could be brought to the notice of this Court. The decisions, which have adopted the view that word 'employer', appearing in the third proviso to Section 30 of the WC Act, shall be interpreted to include the 'insurer' are Koili Be