This petition of revision arises out of an execution proceeding initiated by the Shillong Co-operative Town Bank, Ltd., against Sailendra Kumar Datta, the present petitioner. The execution petition was opposed by the peti­tioner on the ground that it was barred by limitation.

(2) On the 5th September, 1950, it appears that the counsel for the parties were heard on the objection raised by the judgment-debtor. After hearing them, the learned 'Ex-officio' Sub-Judge, Shillong, ordered that the records of execution cases mentioned in the petition for execution be put up on the 11th September 1950. On that date, the counsel for the judg­ment-debtor was present but the decree-hol­der and his counsel were both absent. The learned Judge dismissed the application for default stating that the decree-holder was absent and was taking no steps. On the 26th April 1951, the decree-holder applied for res­toration of the execution petition. The coun­sel for the parties were heard the same day and the execution petition was restored under S. 151, Civil P. C. The order passed by the learned Judge on the petition for restoration of the original petition for execution is very brief. All that it states is that "Heard Law­yers. Case restored to file under 151, Civil P. C."

(3) This petition of revision is directed against this order. On behalf of the petitioner his learned counsel Mr. Barua has urged first that S. 151, Civil P. C., did not apply to exe­cution proceedings. The decree-holder whose execution petition had been dismissed for default could not invoke the provisions con­tained in it and the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in resorting to his inherent jurisdiction for restoring the execution appli­cation.

(4) In my opinion, this contention should not prevail. It is true that O. 9, R. 9, Civil P. C. does not in terms apply to execution proceedings. It could also be not applied to execution pro­ceedings even when read along with S. 141, Civil P. C. Their Lordships of the Privy Coun­cil held in 'THAKUR PRASAD v. FAKIR ULLAH'. 17 All 106, that the proceedings spoken of in S. 647 of the old Code to which S. 141 of the present Code corresponds include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probate, guardianship and so .forth and do not include executions. Since this decision, there has been a large consensus of authority which holds that O. 9, R.9, cannot be applied to execution proceedings by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 141. The learned counsel for the parties also are agreed so far. The question is whether the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction could restore an execution application dismissed for default in suitable cases.

So far as this question is concerned, I am quite clear that the use of the inherent powers of the Court for restoration of an execution application dismissed for default cannot be excluded in its entirety. The exercise of in­herent powers for restoration of an execution petition may be unavoidable unless apparent injustice is allowed to be perpetuated in some case. Apart from this, the main reason for drawing on the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in dealing with an application for res­toration of an execution petition dismissed for default, is that the order of dismissal for de­fault when made is not covered by any ex­press provision in the Code. The Code is un­deniably not exhaustive. The Court has no option but to dismiss the application for de­fault if the decree-holder does not attend or refuses or neglects to take necessary steps to enable the Court to proceed with the execu­tion.

If the case is not covered by R. 57 of O. 21, the dismissal for default of an execution appli­cation is possible only in the exercise of inherent powers of the Court. If the inherent jurisdiction can be resorted to for dismissal, it should be possible to restore the execution application in the exercise of that inherent power in suitable cases, particularly where the order dismissin

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