1971 Supreme(Gau) 15
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
P.K.Goswami, D.M.Sen, JJ.
Naresh Chandra Sen -Appellant
Versus
Deputy Commissioner (Supply) United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Shillong -Respondent
Civil Rule No. 189 of 1969
Decided On : 09-03-1971
B.M.Mahanta, K.Sharma, N.M.Lahiri
In an administrative order of cancellation, the authority concerned must provide a reasonable opportunity to the affected party to defend themselves and must consider the interest of the general public before passing the final order.
Headnote:
LICENCE CANCELLATION - FOODSTUFFS (DISTRIBUTION) CONTROL ORDER, 1958 - CLAUSE 3 (2) - REASONS FOR CANCELLATION - OPINION OF DIRECTOR - INTEREST OF GENERAL PUBLIC - NATURAL JUSTICE - PRINCIPLES VIOLATED.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner's retail dealer license for foodstuffs was canceled, and his security deposit was forfeited due to a shortage of sugar found during an inspection. The petitioner explained that the sugar was in a nearby godown due to ongoing repairs at the shop, but the explanation was rejected.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the impugned order was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity to explain the subsequent fact of his refusal to hand over the account books, which was relied upon as a basis for cancellation.
Issues: 1. Whether the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice? 2. Whether the Director formed an opinion that the revocation was necessary or expedient in the interest of the general public?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. An administrative order of cancellation must afford a reasonable opportunity to the party against whom the order is sought to be made. 2. Under Clause 3 (2) of the Order, the Director must record reasons and express an opinion that the revocation is necessary or expedient in the interest of the general public.
Final Decision: The court quashed the impugned order for violating the principles of natural justice and for failing to express an opinion on the necessity or expediency of the cancellation in the interest of the general public.
2. The petitioner was appointed as a retail dealer on 29th November, 1962 on certain terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment (Annexure 1). On 11th December, 1968 the respondent No. 2, who was the Sub-divisional Officer (Supply) under the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent No. 1) found shortage of 69.100 grams of sugar in the course of checking his shop. The licence was later suspended by an order dated 17th December, 1968 and he was asked to explain why the same should not be cancelled and the security money be forfeited. The petitioner submitted his explanation stating that since he was personally not present in the shop, the employee concerned could not inform the officer that a portion of the sugar was in his godown nearby, where it had been removed earlier on account of the shop premises being under repairs. The respondent No. 1 did not accept the explanation and cancelled the licence and forfeited the security deposit by the impugned order.
3. The impugned order is passed under Clause 3 (2) of the Order, which may be read:
"The Director may, after giving an appointed retailer an opportunity of stating his case and for reasons to be recorded in writing, amend, vary, suspend or revoke his appointment whenever, in the opinion of the Director, it is in the interest of the general public necessary or expedient so to do, and in every such case the appointed retailer shall be bound to surrender, on demand, to the Director the order of appointment for endorsement or cancellation, as the case may be." The impugned order (Annexure 4) does not disclose any reasons. This order, however, may be considered as one communicating the order of cancellation and forfeiture of security deposit The original records are produced before us by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and we find that the Deputy Commissioner agreed with the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer for cancellation of the appointment. Although, therefore, the reasons were not communicated to the petitioner, we may assume in this case that reasons have been recorded by the Deputy Commissioner. It is also not denied that he is authorised to perform the functions of the Director. From a perusal of the reasons, we find that a Sub-Inspector of Supply had gone to the shop of the petitioner on 23rd December, 1968 for seizing his stock-book and sale-register of rice, sugar etc., but that he refused to handover the same. This fact was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner on 28th December, 1968 when he made an endorsement in these words, namely- "This will go against him." Indeed, this did go against the petitioner, as we find, on a perusal of the reasons for cancelling the licence, the fact of the petitioner's refusal to handover the account books was relied upon by the authority. When he had been earlier asked to show cause, this ground was not a basis of the charge; yet, without giving any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to explain this subsequent fact of refusal by him to handover the account books, the impugned order was based, inter alia on this fact. Even in an administrative order of this kind, it is necessary that reasonable opportunity should be afforded to a party against whom an order of cancellation of the kind is sought to be made. The order is therefore invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice.
4, There is yet another serious infirmity in the order. Under Clause 3 (2) of the Order, the Director may revoke the appointment whenever in his opinion, it is in the interest