1971 Supreme(Gau) 28
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
P.K.Goswami, B.N.Sarma, JJ.
Rajendra Nath Sarma -Appellant
Versus
Ramdhin Rajbhor -Respondent
Second Appeal No. 62 of 1967
Decided On : 30-04-1971
D.K.Sharma, J.N.Sharma, B.N.Sharma, Meera Sharma, L.K.Sharma
A lease is not automatically terminated by the destruction of a house on the leased property, unless the lessee exercises his option to avoid the lease under Section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
Headnote:
LEASE - DETERMINATION - DESTRUCTION OF HOUSE - SECTION 108(E) OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - SECTION 56 OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed a suit for possession of land, alleging that the defendant was a tenant who had forcibly constructed a house on the land after the original house was burnt down. The defendant admitted that he had leased the land from the plaintiff and constructed five thatched houses on it, but claimed that the lease had terminated when the houses were destroyed by fire.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the lease had not been terminated by the destruction of the house, as the defendant had not exercised his option to avoid the lease under Section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. The court also held that Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, which deals with frustration of contracts, did not apply to leases, and therefore the defendant could not rely on the destruction of the house to avoid the lease.
Issues: Whether the lease had been terminated by the destruction of the house.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the lease had not been terminated by the destruction of the house, as the defendant had not exercised his option to avoid the lease under Section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. The court also held that Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, which deals with frustration of contracts, did not apply to leases, and therefore the defendant could not rely on the destruction of the house to avoid the lease.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
2. The plaintiff's case is that he is the owner of the land mentioned in the schedule measuring 1 Bigha 8 Lechas of dag No. 44/557 Annual Patta standing in his name. The plaintiff had his houses on the land and the defendant occupied one thatched house on a monthly rent of Rs. 5/-since December, 1954. This house was burnt in 1956 and thereafter the defendant, in spite of protests from the plaintiff, forcibly constructed his house there and has been in wrongful occupation of the land. There was some dispute regarding the annual patta between the plaintiff and the defendant. But the matter was finally settled by an order of the Revenue Board on 5th August, 1963, holding that the plaintiff's patta was in force. The defendant was trying to make further constructions on the land in spite of protests from the plaintiff and hence this suit for khas possession of the land by "removal of the temporary houses of the defendant."
The defendant admitted that the plaintiff had leased out the land measuring 4 kathas of the annual patta on 3rd December, 1954, at Rs. 5/- per mensem "for doing business by constructing the house thereon." The defendant thereafter constructed five thatched houses on the land. The houses were gutted by fire on 15th January, 1956 and the defendant again constructed his house on the land in suit. The defendant further states that after taking lease from the plaintiff, the latter gave assurance to execute a sale deed for the land in suit in favour of the defendant and took a sum of Rs. 370/- by instalments. He therefore prayed for dismissal of the suit.
3. The learned Munsiff dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable in absence of a prayer for declaration of right and title to the land. The learned Subordinate Judge in appeal decreed the suit on the ground that the defendant admitted the plaintiff's title in his written statement as well as in Ext. A (same as Ext. 7), a letter dated 15th September, 1955 written by the defendant to the plaintiff. Since the learned Munsiff held the defendant to be a tenant first and thereafter a trespasser on the land, the learned Subordinate Judge on that finding held the suit to be maintainable and decreed the same. Hence this second appeal.
4. The only point which is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the defendant was a tenant the suit is liable for dismissal in absence of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is admitted that no notice has been served on the defendant. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that since the house which had been let out to the defendant was destroyed by fire, the lease came to an end and the defendant, after that, was only continuing as a trespasser and hence no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary. He invokes the provisions of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, in support of his submission.
5. It is the plaintiff's case that the defendant came to the land in suit and occupied his house thereon as a tenant. When the house was gutted bv fire, the defendant instead of surrendering the land, constructed his own house on the land in spite of protest and continued to occupy the same. On the above facts, the point that arises for consideration is whether the lease that is admitted by the defendant determined on the destruction of the house. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines 'lease'. It is a transfer of a right to em'ov immovable property. It is not a contract but a concluded transfer. There may be some covenants in the lease, but that does not make it less a transfer of the right to enioy the property. Since the right to em'ov the property has been already transferred under the lease to the defendant, under Section 111 it will determine