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1972 Supreme(Gau) 35

GAUHATI HIGH COURT
M. C. PATHAK AND BAHARUL ISLAM, J.
Idris Ali -Appellant
Versus
Abdul Samad Barbhuva -Respondent
S.A. 12 of 1969
Decided On : 09-06-1972

Advocates Appeared:
B.K. Das, M.A. Laska

Oral evidence is not admissible to modify the terms of a written contract that has been registered.

Headnote:

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT - ORAL EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY - SECTION 91 AND 92 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT - SECTION 16(C) OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT - READINESS AND WILLINGNESS TO PERFORM CONTRACT.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for reconveyance of land. The defendant admitted execution of the contract and the first extension of the period for 2 years. He denied verbal extension of time for a further period of one year. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that oral evidence to modify the terms of the contract, which has been reduced to writing, is not admissible in evidence. The court also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for specific performance as he had not averred and proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Issues: 1. Whether oral evidence is admissible to modify the terms of a written contract? 2. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 91 of the Evidence Act bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract that has been reduced to writing. Section 92(4) of the Evidence Act also bars oral evidence to prove the existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify a contract that has been registered. 2. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract.

Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the appeal and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court.

Judgement

PATHAK, J. :- This appeal is from the decree passed by the Assistant District Judge, Silchar.

2. The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract for reconveyance in respect of the suit land measuring 1B 4K 4 Chataks. as described in the schedule. The plaintiffs case is that on 23-2-60 he sold the suit land to the defendant at Rs. 200 with a korar from the defendant to re-convey the land within 3 years on payment of the same consideration. As the Plaintiff could not pay the consideration within the stipulated period, he got the time extended by two years more by an endorsement made by the defendant on the reverse of the korar on 16-2-63. Before expiry of the extended period also he could not make payment of the consideration and therefore he got the time further extended for another year by a verbal agreement in presence of the village elders. On 2-3-66 he tendered the consideration but the Defendant refused to reconvey the land. On 15th February, 1966 the Plaintiff filed the suit.

3. The Defendant admits execution of the "Korarnama" and the first extension of the period for 2 years. He however denies verbal extension of time for a further period of one year. He also states that he has made further improvement on the land.

4. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed :-

1. Is there any cause of action for the suit?

2. Is the suit barred by waiver, estoppel and acquiescence ?

3. Whether the defendant agreed to resell the land within 16-2-1966?

4. To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled ?

5. Both the parties adduced evidence and produced some documents including Ext I which is the Ekrarnama.

6. The learned trial Court disbelieved the story of further extension of time till 16-2-66 and refused to accept the oral evidence in this regard. Accordingly he dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Assistant District Judge held that under the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act oral evidence to modify the written agreement was admissible and as such the learned trial Court erred in law in refusing to rely on the oral evidence regarding the extension of time for the second time. On consideration of the oral evidence the learned Assistant District Judge found that time was really extended and he therefore decreed the Plaintiffs suit reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. Hence this appeal.

7. Mr. B. K. Das. the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has raised three points in this case :-

(i) that the learned Assistant District Judge erred in law in receiving oral evidence to show modification of the contract under Ext. I and his interpretation of Section 92 of the Evidence Act was erroneous.

(ii) that the learned Assistant District Judge erred in law in making out a new case for the Plaintiff beyond the pleading,

(iii) that in the plaint or at any subsequent stage of the proceeding the Plaintiff never averred that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and as such the Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment.

8. We have heard the learned counsel Mr. M.A. Laskar, appearing on behalf of the Respondent at length.

9. The first point that arises for consideration is whether oral evidence to modify the contract put into writing in Ext. I is admissible in evidence. In other words whether oral evidence regarding modification of the terms of the contract as laid down in Ext. I is admissible in evidence.

10. In the instant case the Plaintiff has stated that there was an agreement for reconveyance of the land in question within 3 years from 23-2-66 on payment of the consideration. He admittedly failed to pay the consideration within 3 years but before the expiry of that period he got the stipulated period extended by two years more by an endorsement made by the defendant on the reverse of Ext. I on 16-2-1963. The Plaintiff admitted that he could not pay the amount within the extended period of two years. But he stated that in presence of village elder



































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