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1972 Supreme(Gau) 72

GAUHATI HIGH COURT
BAHARUL ISLAM, J.
Raja Ram Soni -Appellant
Versus
Krishna Prasad Singh -Respondent
Second Appeal No. 117 of 1972
Decided On : 25-08-1972

Advocates Appeared:
J.P. Bhattacharjee and S.N. Medhi, B.C. Barua, M.K. Bhattacharjee

A notice to quit should be construed in a way to ascertain whether the defendant understood it, not to find fault with it. A decree for future compensation cannot be passed without an enquiry as required by Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Headnote:

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - SECTION 106 - NOTICE TO QUIT - VALIDITY - CONSTRUCTION - FUTURE COMPENSATION - DECREE - ORDER 20, RULE 12 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - ENQUIRY - PRELIMINARY DECREE - FINAL DECREE.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant from a holding in the Sibsagar Municipality and for arrear of rent. The defendant contested the suit, claiming that he was a monthly tenant and protected from eviction under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment, arrear of rent, and future compensation. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the notice to quit was valid and that the defendant had not rebutted the plaintiff's evidence that the tenancy ended with the end of an English month. The court also held that the decree for future compensation was illegal as it was passed without an enquiry as required by Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issues: 1. Whether the notice to quit was valid? 2. Whether the decree for future compensation was legal?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The purpose of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is to terminate a tenancy by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of tenancy if the purpose of the tenancy was agricultural or manufacturing, or by 15 days notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy, if the tenancy was from month to month and for any purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing. The notice should not be interpreted in a way to find fault with it, but only in a way to ascertain whether the defendant understood it. 2. Order 20, Rule 12 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate immediate passing of a decree for future compensation from the institution of the suit till the delivery of possession to the decree-holder. It only contemplates an enquiry into the matter and the decree may be passed only at a subsequent stage.

Final Decision: The court set aside the decree for future compensation and dismissed the appeal. The parties were left to bear their own costs.

Judgement

This second appeal by the defendant is directed against a decree for eviction and arrear of rent and compensation passed by the Assistant District Judge, Jorhat, in Title Appeal No. 25 of 1970. The plaintiffs suit was for ejectment of defendant from holding No. 149 comprising two rooms in the Sibsagar Municipality and also for arrear of rent of Rs. 114/- for September and October, 1968.

2. The defendant, has filed a written statement and contested the suit. He pleads that he is a monthly tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the said holding at a monthly rent of Rs. 57/-. His defence is that as the plaintiff does not require the house bona fide, he is protected from eviction under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act.

3. The learned Munsiff framed as many as 7 issues and after trial decreed the suit for ejectment, arrear of rent with cost and also decreed future compensation. On appeal the judgment and decree of the Munsif were upheld by the Assistant District Judge. Hence this appeal.

4. Only two points have been urged before me by learned counsel for the appellant. His first contention is that the notice of eviction (Ext. 7) is not valid in law and he draws my attention to the last para of the notice which is as follows :

"Accordingly, I serve this notice upon you determining the tenancy on 31-10-68 or on any day within that date, when according to you, the tenancy ends and ask you to give vacant possession of the rooms with its compound on the 1st day of November, 1968, failing which my client will file a suit for your eviction and that at your risk and responsibility."

Learned Counsel finds fault with the portion "or on any date within that date, when according to you, the tenancy ends". His submission is that the plaintiff ought to have come with a definite case with regard to the month of tenancy and ought to have terminated the tenancy according to that month.

5. There is no doubt that according to the plaintiff the tenancy was according to the Gregorian calendar and that the house was for residential purpose and therefore he terminated the tenancy by a 15 days notice at the end of the English calendar month, namely, October, 1968. He, however, gave an option to the defendant to vacate it earlier on a date on which, according to the latter, the tenancy ended. In the written statement the defendant has not stated that the tenancy was not according to the Gregorian Calendar or that it did not end with the end of a month according to the said Calendar month. The learned Munsif found that the tenancy was terminated by a valid notice of ejectment. The learned Assistant District Judge has considered Ext. 7 and has found that when the plaintiff gave evidence on oath in Court stating that the tenancy was according to English month and that it was terminated by notice Ext. 7, and the defendant chose not to examine himself and deny the plaintiffs evidence, the plaintiffs evidence remained unrebutted. The learned Judge ultimately came to the finding that it was clear that the defendant was given clear 15 days notice of eviction.

6. The purpose of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is to terminate a tenancy by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of tenancy if the purpose of the tenancy was agricultural or manufacturing, or by 15 days notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy, if the tenancy was from month to month and for any purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing. The notice should not be interpreted in a way to find fault with it, but only in a way to ascertain whether the defendant understood it. The Privy Council in the case of Harihar Banerjee v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102, has held :

"The principles governing the construction of a notice to quit laid down by English cases are equally applicable to cases arising in India and they establish that notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them,














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