Where an alternative, adequate, and efficacious remedy is available under a statute, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable.

ORDER:- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directed against an order of the Executive Committee of the Marigaon Mahkuma Parishad, Marigaon, Settling (24) Lahorighat Bi-weekly Bazar with Ismail Hussain, respondent No. 5 in exercise of its power under the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 and the Rules flamed thereunder.

2. Mr. S.C. Das, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Intervener (Shri Manai Basumatari) has raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner ought not to be granted any relief under the extraordinary jurisdiction as the petitioner has come to the court by skipping over his statutory remedy provided for in Section 138. Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972, "the Panchayati Act" for short, as there is alternative and efficacious remedy provided for in Section 138 of the Panchayati Act for getting full, adequate and efficacious relief from the authority constituted to hear matters under the said section.

3. Counsel submits that at all relevant time when the impugned order was made the provision of Article 226(3) read as:

"No petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force." but by Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 clause (3) was substituted and there is no such bar at present. But, according to Shri S.C. Das with whom Shri P.C. Barua, the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 joins hand, submits that there is positively a ready remedy provided for in Section 138 of the Panchayati Act and the petitioner is not entitled to relief provided for in Article 226 of the Constitution unless the petitioner can bring his case within the realm of violation of his constitutional right or establishes violation of the principles of natural justice or questions the validity of the Act and/or the jurisdiction of the authority in rendering the order and/or questions the legality or validity of the Constitution of the authority and/ or the appellate or revisional authority. The petitioners case does not fall under any of the categories. The learned counsel, in support of his contention, relies on a Division Bench decision of this Court, namely, Lachhi Ram Choudhury v. Chief Executive Councillor, Kokrajhar Mahkuma Parishad in Civil Rule No. 92 of 1978 decided on 9-11-1978.

4. Mr. S.N. Bhuyan, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is a remedy provided under Section 138 of "the Panchayat Act" but the same is not "efficacious". The learned counsel submits that notwithstanding availability of an alternative remedy the petitioner is entitled to petition under Article 226 and get relief thereunder. The relevant provision of Section 138(2) of "the Panchayat Act" reads as under:

"138(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-section (1), the State Government may at any time call for the records in any manner from a Gaon Panchayat or Mohkuma Parishad and give such order as may be deemed necessary after examination of such records. The order of the State Government in this regard shall be final."

5. On perusal of the entire scheme of the Panchayat Act it appears clear that "Settling Authorities" and "Confirming Authorities" have been constituted by the Statute to settle such "hats", "bazars" etc. The Act provides for right of appeals/revisions against the orders of Settlement and/or confirmation. An appeal is provided for against an order of Gaon Panchayat or Mahkuma Parishad under S.138(1) of "the Panchayat Act. There is a provision for getting relief in revision under Section 138(2) of the Act. It shows that there is a hierarchy of authorities constituted by the Act itself to dispose of all matters touching such settlements in appeals or revisions against the orders rendered by a Gaon Panchayat or Mahkuma Parishad. There was some doubt whether Section 138(2) provided any ri