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1981 Supreme(Gau) 146

GAUHATI HIGH COURT
B.L.Hansaria, J.
Ajit Banik -Appellant
Versus
State of Assam -Respondent
Criminal Revision No. 19/77
Decided On : 08-12-1981

Advocates Appeared:
S.S.Rahman, K.P.Sharma, S.K.Sen

The court held that teer tickets are instruments of betting and that possession of such tickets is an offence under the Assam Games and Betting Act, 1970.

Headnote:

ASSAM GAMES AND BETTING ACT, 1970 - SECTION 7, 14, 18, 19 - TEER TICKETS - INSTRUMENTS OF BETTING - POSSESSION - SEIZURE - EVIDENCE - PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT - APPLICABILITY.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner was found guilty under section 14 of the Assam Games and Betting Act, 1970, for possession of instruments of betting, namely, teer tickets. The prosecution's case was that the petitioner was selling teer tickets when he was apprehended by the police. The petitioner challenged the conviction on the grounds that there was no clinching evidence regarding the seizure of the teer tickets from his possession, that the teer tickets were not instruments of betting, and that there was a violation of section 7 of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the evidence of the police constable who apprehended the petitioner was sufficient to prove that the teer tickets were seized from the petitioner's possession. The court also found that the teer tickets were instruments of betting, as they were used for betting on a game of chance. The court further found that there was no violation of section 7 of the Act, as the police constable was within his rights to arrest the petitioner and seize the teer tickets found on his person.

Issues: 1. Whether the teer tickets were found in the possession of the petitioner. 2. Whether the teer tickets could be called instruments of betting. 3. Whether there was any violation of section 7 of the Assam Games and Betting Act, 1970.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the evidence of the police constable who apprehended the petitioner was sufficient to prove that the teer tickets were seized from the petitioner's possession. 2. The court held that the teer tickets were instruments of betting, as they were used for betting on a game of chance. 3. The court held that there was no violation of section 7 of the Act, as the police constable was within his rights to arrest the petitioner and seize the teer tickets found on his person.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition and upheld the conviction of the petitioner.

Hansaria, J.-

This revision requires three question in the main to be answered : (1) whether the articles said to be teer tickets were found in the possession of the petitioner; (2) whether these tickets could be called instruments of betting; and (3) whether there was any violation of section 7 of the Assam Games and Betting Act, 1970, for short the Act.

2. These questions need determination as the petitioner was found guilty under section 14 of the Act whose lethality operates, inter alia, when anybody is found in possession of any instruments of betting. The learned trial court was satis­fied about the guilt of the accused and awarded minimum punishment provided by law which is R. I. for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The same has been upheld by the lear­ned Sessions Judge on appeal. Hence this revision.

3. It has given me pleasure to find that Mr. Sarma, a comparatively junior counsel has worked hard and tried his best to save the petition. His first attack is that there was no clinching evidence regarding seizure of material Exts. 1 to 14, described as teer tickets, from the possession of the peti­tioner. This submission has been made because PW-2 alone has testified about the same. Though PW-1 was also perhaps produced by the prosecution to prove this fact, his statement in the Court was that he had not seen the accused person selling teer tickets, nor did he testify if he had seen PW-2 seizing the tickets from the possession of the accused. Shri Sarma is, therefore, right that PW-1 cannot be accepted to be a witness regarding possession of "teer tickets'' by the petiti­oner. But then PW-2 (a police constable) is very categorical. According to him when he was passing from near the shop of the accused, he saw crowd there which attracted his atten­tion, and coming to the spot he saw accused selling teer tickets, which were seized by him. Material Exts. 1 to 14 were identified to be those tickets. The submission relating to this witness that he being the person who had appre­hended the accused, his sole testimony should not be accepted. There seem to be no obstacle in law in accepting the sole testimony of such witness. Reference may be made in this connection to State of Gujrat vs. Jaganbhai, AIR 1966 SC 1633. It was also a case relating to prevention of gambling. The Supreme Court accepted the contention of the State that it would not be correct to say that the evidence of the Police Inspector in whose name the warrant for search was issued requires corroboration in each and every case. Similar view was taken in Giridhari Lal vs. Assistant Collector, AIR 1971 SC 28 wherein the submission that if "an investigating officer conducts a search his evidence cannot be relied on less it is corroborated," was characterized as "a novel proposition,"

4. If this context it would be apposite to refer to Babulal vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1971 SC 1277 where it was pointed out that it is not a rub of law and the evidence of a Food Inspector cannot be accepted without corroboration, as he can­not be said to be an accomplice. What was held in this regard in Pershadi vs. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 211 is more signi­ficant. In that case the sole evidence of a Police Officer rela­ting to the statement made by an accused while leading to the discovery of certain incriminating materials was accepted even though other witnesses were silent about the same. Thus, there is no bar in law in relying on the lone statement of PW- 2. Further, we find from his evidence that the persons who were purchasing the tickets had fled away and as such no other person could have been expected to testify about the act of selling, or of possession of the teer tickets by the petitioner. So, it is a fit case where the sole evidence of PW-2 could be acted upon, as has been done by the courts below. I do not find any legal infirmity in the same.

5. The next submission is whether the articles seized were instruments of betting. Shri Sarma submits that the prosecution mis






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