Filing of a true copy of an impugned judgment is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the Nagaland Rules for the Administration of Justice.

This revision under Rules for the Administra­tion of Justice in Nagaland, for short "the Rules" is projected against the order passed by Mr. A. Sanmugam, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung, confirming the order passed by Mr. R. S. Bedi, Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner at Mokokchung. The present appellant preferred an appeal before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner and also presented an application for adducing further evidence or 'additional evide­nce' in the appeal. Appellate court issued notices to the Respon­dents-opposite parties. He dismissed the appeal in limine by the impugned order holding that the appeal was presented beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Rule 34 of "the Rules" and, therefore, the appeal was barred by limitation. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner also held that the appeal was incompetent as it was not accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment appealed against. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner also rejected the prayer of the appellants for addu­cing additional evidences.

2. Learned Advocate Genera), Nagaland, appearing for the petitioners submits that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Advocate General has made a three pronged attack on the impug­ned judgment. The first contention is that the order of rejection of the application for adducing additional evidence was bad as no cogent reason for rejection was assigned by the learned Deputy Commissioner. At any rate, the order was without juris­diction once he held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Secondly, the counsel contends that the appeal was palpably presented within the period of 30 days from the date of the decision and the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner committed a fatal error of law apparent on the face of the records in concluding that the appeal had been filed beyond 30 days from the date of the decision and he points to the records to substantiate his submission. The third contention is that a true copy of the judgment was filed along with the memo of appeal and in due course 'the certified copy' was filed and the same was also before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner on the date of the final determination of the appeal, as such, the appeal was filed in conformity with the provisions of Rule 34 of "the Rules".

3. On perusal of the application for taking additional evidence, we find that the petitioners had desired to adduce additional evidence before the appellate court on a question of "custo­mary law". It was a mixed question of law and fact. The customary law raised is interesting and worth consideration. However, it was for the appellate court to consider the applica­tion on merit and to dispose it by giving cogent reasons why it turned down the prayer. In the instant case, we do not find any cogent reason for rejection. An appellate court has power to permit the parties to adduce additional evidence, if the court considers such additional evidence is necessary for just decision of the case. Therefore, it is entirely for the appellate court to allow or reject the prayer but he must give a reasoned decision. It is indeed correct that in the impugned judgment we do not find any cogent reason for the order of rejection of additional evidence. At any rate, when the appellate court reached the conclusion that the appeal was barred by limitation it had no jurisdiction vested in it by law to decide the ques­tion. Under these circumstances, the first contention is accepted. However, we leave the matter at that, as we have decided to remit the appeal for rehearing by the Additional Deputy Commissioner. He shall consider the merit of the application when the ques­tion will come up for decision before him. He shall hear the parties and dispose of the prayer in accordance with the law.

4. Insofar as the second contention is concerned we are constrained to hold that the appellate court went wrong in assuming that the appeal was presented beyond 30