This revision petition arises from orders of the Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh made in Criminal Revision No.88 (4)89 on 30.10.89 and 3.11.89.

2. On 23.10.89, the Executive "magistrate, Dibrugarh in Case No. 241 of 1989 (renewed as 334 of 1989) passed preliminary order under section 145 (I), Cr.P.C. as well as order of attachment of the subject of dispute under section 146(1) Cr. P.C, Being aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the second parry Bhabani Gogoi filed Criminal Revision No. 88(1)89. The learned Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh by an order dated 30 10.89 admitted tie revision position and fixed 3.11.89 for hearing on stay matter. On 3.11.89, the In-charge Sessions Judge stayed the operation of the order dated 23.10.89 of the Magistrate in respect of the order of attachment of the subject of dispute. Hence this petition by the first party.

3. Mr. C. Bjruah, the iearnel counsel for the petitioner has contended that orders passed under sections !45 (1) and 146 (1;, Cr.P.C are an interlocutory order and, therefore, the revision is not maintainable under section 397 (2), Cr.P.C.

4. As regards the order under section 145 (1), the learned counsel has contended that the proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C. deal only with the factum of possession of the parties as on the date of the preliminary order passed under section 145 (1), Cr .P.C. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed property. The order is subject to the decision of the civil Court. The unsuccessful party therefore can get relief in the civil Court as the declaration of the possession of one of the parties in the proceeding is until he is evicted therefrom in due course of law.

5. In respect of the order made under section 146 (1), Cr.P.C, the learned counsel has submitted that an order made under section 146 (1) is inherently temporary in nature as the order may he withdrawn at any time by the Magistrate if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The learned counsel has further contended that an order under section 146 (1), Cr.P.C. is nothing but a step-in-aid in the pending proceeding under section 145, Cr.P.C. Therefore, the order is neither final nor quasi final. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the Following decisions of different High Courts-Premlata vs. Ram Lubhaya, 1978 Cri LJ 1822 (SB); Brija Lal Chakoo vs. Abdul Ahad Nishati, 1980 Cri LJ 89 (FB); Kartar Singh vs. Pritam Kanr, 1984 Cri LJ 248 (DB); Sishu vs. State of Haryana, 1982 Cri LJ 124 (SB); Bachan Mahto vs. State of Bihar, 1988 Cri LJ 1426 (DB).

6. The expression "interlocutory order" has not been defined in the Code. The question then is, What is the meaning of an 'interlocutory order'?

7. This Court in Trihib Sarma vs. State of Assam, (1985) 2 GLR 229 (FB), has, after referring to various dictionaries and decisions mentioned in the judgment, held :

"From the above definition the general characteristics of an interlocutory order can be seen. We start from the comme­ncement or inception of an action, on one end and the final judgment or determination of the action on other end. In between those two ends numerous types of orders are passed, some on oral or simple prayers and some on interlocutory applications or proceedings. These orders do not finally determine the action. Some of the orders may finally determine the interlocutory applications or proceedings and are final in so far as those interlocutory applications or proceedings and the rights involved therein are concerned. But those will be interlocutory orders vis-­a-vis the main action is concerned. Some intermediate orders are passed otherwise than in any such interlocutory applications or proceedings Generally speaking, all these orders will be treated as interlocutory orders. None of these orders will finally determine the action and the disputed right. AH those orders passed in between the commencement and the final decision or d

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