SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1992 Supreme(Gau) 114

GAUHATI HIGH COURT
D.N.Baruah, J.
Kripesh Chandra Misra -Appellant
Versus
Upendra Kumar Dey and Others -Respondent
Second Appeal No. 94 of 1985
Decided On : 10-07-1992

Advocates Appeared:
K.K.Dey, S.Kataki

In a suit for recovery of immovable property based on title, the question of limitation being run from the date of dispossession does not arise.

Headnote:

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - SECTION 5, 65 - SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 - SECTION 34 - SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY - CAUSE OF ACTION - ADVERSE POSSESSION - LIMITATION - DECLARATION - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - SUMMARY

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the defendants and for recovery of khas possession of the suit land. The defendants denied the allegations and averments made in the plaint. The trial court decreed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove cause of action.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the plaintiff had right, title, and interest over the suit land and the suit was filed for recovery of possession. In a suit for recovery of immovable properties based on title, Article 65 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Under the said Article, a suit can be brought within 12 years from the date of when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse. So long the possession of the defendants is not adverse, the time will not run.

Issues: Whether the appellate court was justified in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit on the ground of want of cause of action.

Ratio Decidendi: The High Court held that the appellate court erred in law by holding that there was no cause of action in view of the failure of the plaintiff to give a specific date of dispossession. The suit having been filed on the basis of title, the question of limitation being run from the date of dispossession does not arise.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the appellate court, and restored the judgment of the trial court.

1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 13.f2.84 passed by the Second Asstt. District Judge, Silchar in Title Appeal No. 47 of 1982, reversing the judgment and decree dated 20.1.82 passed by the Munsiff at Hailakandi in Title Suit No. 68/80.

2. The only point raised before this Court is - "whether the appellate court was justified in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit on the ground of want of cause of action."

3. The appellant as plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the Second Munsiff, Hailakandi (TS 68/80). His case was that the land of third Schedule of the plaint belonged to him. He purchased the land and he was in possession of the said land. First to third respondents dispossessed the appellant from the land described in Schedule-IV, which is part of Schedule -in. Thereafter, he brought the suit for eviction of the Respondent and for recovery of khas possession of the suit land. The first to third respondents appeared and contested the suit by filing written statement. They denied all the allegations and averments made in the plaint. As many as seven issues were framed in the suit. The Second Munsiff, Hailakandi, after recording the evidence of witness decreed the suit with costs. In issue No. 5 the Munsiff held that the appellant was able to prove his right, title and interest over the suit land.

4. Against this judgment and decree, the first to third respondents preferred an appeal (TA 47/82) in the Court of the Second Asstt. District Judge, Cachar, Silchar. The Asstt. District Judge allowed the appeal with cost, holding that the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that he had cause of action to bring the suit. While deciding the Issue Nos. 1 and 3, the Asstt. District Judge observed that the plaintiffs and defendants were in enjoyment of their right since 1956 or so, and therefore, it could be presumed that they were having their boundaries of land well demarcated. The Asstt. District Judge further observed that the first defendant sold out his land to the plaintiff vide Exhibit 2. But the plaintiff could not give any substantial and assertive evidence to show the encroachment or dispossession after 1961. He also found the paragraph 6 of the plaint was vague and inconclusive, where the plaintiff stated that he was dispossessed gradually on different dates. The Asstt District Judge observed thus :-

"A suit for recovery of khas possession is permissive only under Articles 64/65 of the Limitation Act within 12 years from the date of dispossession or adverse possession as the case may be. Here, the plaintiff has failed to give the date of dispossession in order to calculate out whether the suit is within time. Therefore, the pleading is not sufficient to disclose cause of action in favour of the plaintiff."

5. On the basis of this observation, the Asstt. District Judge found that there was no cause of action for the suit and the suit could not be decreed on the basis of such pleadings and evidence. Both the Courts have held that the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the suit land and the suit was filed for recovery of possession. In a suit for recovery of immovable properties based on title, Article 65 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Under the said Article a suit can be brought within 12 years from the date of when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse. So long the possession of the defendants is not adverse, the time will not run.

6. He the instant case, the defendant had not set out any plea of adverse possession. That being the position, the question of dispossession or discontinuance of possession does not arise. Therefore, the Asstt. District Judge erred in law by holding that there was no cause of action in view of the failure of the plaintiff to give specific date of dispossession. The suit having been filed on the basis of title, the question of limitation being run from the date of dispossession does not arise.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent


Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon telegram-icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top