GAUHATI HIGH COURT
J. N. SARMA, J.
Md.Mohar Ali -Appellant
Versus
Md.Mamud Ali and others -Respondent
Second Appeal No. 70 of 1993
Decided On : 25-07-1997
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT - AGREEMENT FOR SALE - DELAY IN FILING SUIT - REASONABLE TIME - DISCRETION OF COURT - SECTION 16(C) OF SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT - SECTION 54 OF LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 10 AND 20 OF CONTRACT ACT - ARTICLE 54 OF LIMITATION ACT.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of a contract, alleging that they had sold a plot of land to the defendant by a registered deed of sale and that there was another registered deed of sale stating that if the plaintiffs returned the consideration money, the land would be reconveyed to them. The plaintiffs claimed that they had requested the defendant to reconvey the land but he had refused, and that he had got the land mutated in his name. The defendant denied executing the reconveyance deed and argued that the suit was barred by limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the agreement for sale was duly executed by the defendant and that the plaintiffs had been and were still ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. However, the court held that the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed more than three years after the date of refusal to perform the contract.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs had established their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract? 2. Whether there was compliance with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act? 3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the plaintiffs had established their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract, as they had requested the defendant to reconvey the land and had been and were still ready and willing to refund the consideration money. 2. The court held that there was no compliance with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, as the plaint did not contain a statement that the plaintiffs had approached the defendant specifically to perform the agreement and that the defendant had not done so. 3. The court held that the suit was barred by limitation, as it was filed more than three years after the date of refusal to perform the contract. The court noted that the period of limitation for a suit for specific performance of a contract is three years from the date of refusal to perform the contract, and that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had filed the suit within this period.
Final Decision: The court allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgments of both the courts below. The suit was dismissed without costs.
The plaintiffs instituted a suit on 19-6-1984 in the Court of the Munsiff No. 1 at Nagaon for specific performance of contract.
2. The brief facts are as follows :
"The plaintiffs sold a plot of land to the defendant by a registered deed of sale on 19-2-1968. On the same date there was another registered deed of sale stating that if the plaintiffs returns back the consideration money, the land sold by the plaintiffs shall be reconveyed to the plaintiffs. It is stated in the plaint that the possession of the land was not delivered to the defendant and it continued with the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs used to pay paddy rent to the defendant. It is stated in para 2 of the plaint that the plaintiffs requested the defendant to reconvey the land for the last 3 to 4 years, but that was not done. But the defendant got the land mutated in his name of 8-3-1984. There also was a proceedings under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. and in that proceedings the possession of the land was declared in favour of the defendant. There was a revision before the Sessions Judge and that revision also was rejected. It is stated in para 3 of the plaint (by way of amendment) that the plaintiffs wanted to refund the money to the defendant but the defendant did not accept the money and as such he did not perform his part of the contract and as such the suit was filed for specific performance of contract.
3. Written statement was filed by the defendant wherein the defendant denied the execution of the reconveyance deed (agreement for sale Ext. I in the suit). It was also stated in the written statement that the plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance of contract. There was a plea that the suit is barred by limitation. Both the courts below held that Ext. I, the agreement for sale was duly executed by the defendant. So, this is basically a findings of fact and in the second appeal I am not inclined to interfere with that findings of fact. The trial Court decreed the suit. There was an appeal and that appeal also was dismissed. Hence, this second appeal.
4. The following are the substantial questions of law :
(i) Whether the readiness and willingness of the appellant to prove his part of contract was established ?
(ii) Whether there was compliance with provision of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act?
5. I have heard Mr. N. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. M. Rahman, learned counsel for respondents.
6. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel urges the following points :
(i) That the plaint is not in conformity with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and as such no decree can be passed on the basis of such a plaint.
(ii) That the agreement (Ext.I) executed is a void one and it was not signed by both the parties.
(iii) That there was inordinate delay in filing the suit and on this ground alone no decree for specific performance of contract can be passed, inasmuch as a decree for specific performance of contract after all is a discretionary relief and that discretion cannot be exercised after a long lapse of time.
7. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rahman, learned counsel for respondents submits that in the agreement for sale (Ext. I) no time limit was fixed and as provided by Section 54 of the Limitation Act the suit can be filed within 3 years from the date of refusal to perform the contract. He submits that the date of refusal in this particular case must be the date on which the defendant got his name mutated to the land that must be deemed to be the final refusal on the part of the defendant and from that date the limitation will run.
8. Before I go to discuss this aspect of the matter, let us take up the second point as urged by Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the appellant. Mr. Chakraborty submits that the contract i.e. Ext. I is void one as it was not signed by both the parties. The argument of Mr. Chakraborty has no force inasmuch as it runs counter to Section 10 of the Contract Act. Section 10 of the Contract Act provides what ag
AIR 1997 SC 1751 : (1997) 3 SCC 1 : 1997 AIR SCW 956 (Foll.)
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