A SHAREHOLDER'S RIGHT TO TRANSFER SHARES IS SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF THE COMPANY. A RESOLUTION PASSED BY A GENERAL MEETING OF THE COMPANY CANNOT IMPOSE ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHT TO TRANSFER THEIR SHARES.

This misc appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) CPC arises out of order dated 30th September, 1997 passed by Civil Judge Senior Division, Dibrugarh in Misc (J) Case No31 of 1997 connected with Title Suit No.50 of 1997, thereby vacating the exparte injunction granted on 14.8.97. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. The subject matter of dispute between the parties is transfer of shares.

2. Plaintiff appellants filed a suit seeking a declaratory decree to the effect that they have a right to purchase the shares of defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 10 and proforma-respondent No. 13 as per resolutions adopted in the extra-ordinary general meeting of the company held on 15,5.97, A permanent injunction seeking to restrain the respondent Nos. 1 to _10 from selling their shares to respondent No. l1 and 12 or any other person without sanction of the Board of Directors and in violation of Articles of Association of the company was also sought and prayed for. The plaintiffs also prayed for an ad-interim injunction. The trial Court by its order dated 14.8.97 granted an exparte ad-interim injunction but the same was vacated by the impugned order. Hence this appeal.

3. Mr. Gogoi learned counsel appearing for the appellant having taken us through the pleadings of the parties, the Articles of Association, the minutes of the extra-ordinary meeting dated 15.5.97 and the resolutions passed therein has raised the following points;

That the trial Court-erred in law as well as in fact in discharging the exparte injunction order granted on 14.8.97. While doing so, the learned Judge of the trial Court was palpably wrong in holding that the resolutions passed at the extra­ordinary general meeting held on 15.5.97 did not confer any rights in favour of the plaintiff. According to him this finding recorded by the trial Court is ex-facie not tenable in law. Distinguishing the case relied upon by the trial Court it was urged that the same was not attracted to the instant case. Referring to various provisions of the Articles of Association, particularly Article 41,41 (a) and 41 (e), he submitted that the trial Court should have been held that the defendants were under an obligation to perform their duty in law as per resolution dated 15.5.97. Explaining the meaning and scope of prima facie case he also pointed out with reference to the impugned order that the trial Court erred in law in pre-judging the suit.

4. Mr. AK Bhattacharyy a, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1-9, while supporting the impugned order, submitted that the order being discretionary one and the same having been properly exercised, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order, more so, in face of the fact that the matter of transfer of shares is pending before the Company Law Board. In the course of b: nt he has taken us through the relevant provisions of the Company of Association and highlighted the fault committed by the plaintiff appellant it taking necessary steps under clause" 41 (a), the selling members could lawfu *,sort to clause 41 (e) to negotiate their sale ,tf shares to any person, at any price ana \ transfer shall have to be compulsorily regisC.^6*1 bv me company. Learned coua ppearing for other parties, respondent No,lv? have supported ^e argument ao ^ed by Mr. Bhattacharyya. Before proceeding to rfeal with the Contentions submissions as made and advanced at the Bar, it would not ^ace to n Certain salient findings of fact arrived at b>' the trial Court.

5. True it a proposition of law, as rightly argued by the appellants' counsel, that in a suit for declaration of title, the Court has power, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 or even under section 151 CPC, to grant ad-interim injunction. Placing strong reliance on Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1SCC 719, it was urged that all that the plaintiff-appellant was required to show that a substantial qu