2007 Supreme(Gau) 204
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
I.A.Ansari, J.
Mojib Uddin Choudhury and Ors. -Appellant
Versus
Fazil Ahmed Choudhury -Resopndent
CRP No. 126 of 2005
Decided On : 13-03-2007
B.Ahmed
The substantive power of the court to execute a decree is derived from section 47, not from Order XXI. Order XXI, rule 97 comes into play when there is resistance or obstruction to possession of the immovable property during the course of execution of a decree.
Headnote:
Execution - Decree Holder - Order XXI - Section 47 - Order XXI, Rule 97
Fact of the Case:
The decree-holder received possession of the decreetal land and the decree stood fully satisfied. The present petitioners filed a petition alleging that the decree-holder had erected fencing around the land, which had been in the use of the present petitioners and others as a public path. The District Magistrate ordered the police to remove the fencing. The decree-holder filed a petition alleging illegal dispossession and prayed for restoration of possession. The court below passed an order directing that the possession of the decree-holder over the land shall not be disturbed by the present petitioners.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the impugned order was without jurisdiction and set it aside.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the decree-holder as an application under order XXI, rule 97, when the decree had already been executed and satisfied.
Ratio Decidendi: The substantive power of the court to execute a decree is derived from section 47, not from Order XXI. When a decree stands executed and no question with regard to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arises between the parties to the suit, section 47 is not attracted. Order XXI, rule 97 comes into play when there is resistance or obstruction to possession of the immovable property during the course of execution of a decree.
Final Decision: The revision succeeded and the impugned order was set aside.
(i) Pursuant to Title Execution Case No. 17/1979, the decree-holder received, on 15.6.2003, possession of the entire decreetal land and the decree, so put in execution, stood fully satisfied. Thereafter, the present petitioners, who were not parties to the said decree, filed a petition before the District Magistrate, Cachar, Silchar, alleging, inter alia, that the decree-holder (i.e., the opposite party herein), had erected fencing around the land, which had been in the use of the present petitioners and others of their locality as a public path, and thereby restraining the present petitioners and others of their said locality from using the land as a path. Based on this petition, the District Magistrate passed an order directing the police to remove the fencing. The decree-holder, then, filed a petition, in the Title Execution Case No. 17/1979 aforementioned, alleging, inter alia, that he had been illegally dispossessed from the land, which, in execution of the said decree, he had been given possession of and accordingly prayed for necessary direction to restore possession of the said land to him. This petition gave rise to Misc. Case No. 25/2003 aforementioned. Having received objection from the present petitioner against the prayer of the decree-holder, and treating the said application as an application made under order XXI, rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('the Code'), the learned court below passed an order, on 14.10.2005, directing that the possession of the decree-holder over the said land shall not be disturbed by the present petitioners. It is this order, which stands impugned in the present revision.
2. I have heard Dr. B. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. None has appeared on behalf of the decree-holder-opposite-party.
3. While considering the present revision, what is of paramount importance to note is that Order XXI deals with various facets of execution of decrees and orders. Order XXI does not come into play if a decree has already been executed, discharged or satisfied. Broadly speaking, the Code stands divided into two parts. While the Sections, which appear in the Code, vest the courts with jurisdiction to deal with such matters, as are mentioned therein, the Rules, framed under various Orders, lay down the procedure for exercise of such jurisdiction. Thus, the Sections are substantive part of the Code and the Rules, framed under various Orders, are procedural part of the Code. The substantive power is derived by a civil court from the various Sections in the Code and not from the Rules framed under the Orders. How a power, conferred on a civil court, or the jurisdiction, vested in the civil court, would be exercised, is a matter of procedure and it is the procedure, which the various Rules, framed under the Orders, indicate.
4. What needs to be, now, carefully noted is that the substantive power of the court to execute a decree is not derived from Order XXI, but from section 47, which makes it clear that all questions, arising between the parties to the suit, in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. How the questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree would be dealt with and determined are contained in the Rules framed under Order XXI. When a decree stands executed and no question with regard to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arises between the parties to the suit, in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, section 47 is not attrac