The instant application is filed by the ap­plicant-appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, for condoning the delay of 831 days in preferring the appeal against the order dated 31.03.2008, passed by the learned Single Judge, in WP(C) No. 118 of 2002, whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition pre­ferred by the applicant-appellant.

2. We have heard Mr. A. Mohendro, learned counsel, appearing for the applicant-appellant as well as Mr. H. Devendro, learned counsel appearing for the State respondents.

3. Mr. A. Mohendro, while urging for the relief sought for, would contend that the ap­peal against the order dated 31.03.2008 could not be preferred due to the fault of the learned counsel engaged by the applicant-appellant in the writ petition. He further sub­mits that the reasons for causing delay in pre­ferring the appeal have been properly ex­plained in paragraph 3 to 11 of the instant application. He further submits that by this time it is a settled position of law that an applica­tion for condonation of delay has to be con­sidered liberally with a pragmatic approach and a litigant should not be penalized for the error/mistake committed by his counsel.

4. Mr. H. Devendro, learned State coun­sel, while resisting the prayer for condonation of delay, would contend that there is no doubt that delay of 831 days as prayed for or more than that can also be condoned by a Court subject to the same is properly and satisfac­torily explained, hi the instant case, the applicant-appellant tried to relieve himself from his duties and obligations, shifting the responsi­bility of delay on the shoulder of his engaged learned counsel in the writ petition he con­tended. He further submits that in the instant application there is no specific averment on which date the petitioner met with his learned counsel and what was his advice, more so, relating to the advice of the learned counsel, he did not annex any document with the application except one no objection letter. Thus, it would not be proper for the Court to con­done the unexplained delay of 831 days as prayed for.

5. We have given our anxious thought to the submission of the learned counsel of the parties. We have also perused the contention made in paragraphs 3 to 11 of the instant ap­plication. On perusal of the contention as stated in the application, it appears that there are only some vague and omnibus allegations against the learned counsel engaged by the petitioner in his writ petition. From the appli­cation, it also appears that the applicant-appellant engaged more than one lawyer in the writ petition filed by him, and admittedly, he did not divulge the name of the lawyer, for whose fault he could not file the writ appeal in time. It further appears from Annexure- C/1 i.e. a no objection letter, issued by one learned counsel, namely, L. Jayanta Roy, wherein he stated that he had no objection to conduct the writ petition, being WP(C) No. 118/02, and any writ appeal with reference to the said writ petition by any other Advo­cate other than him, meaning thereby, the learned counsel had consented only to the engagement of any other counsel in the writ petition and with reference to the same in an appeal. Therefore, according to us, it cannot be safely said that the delay caused in prefer­ring the appeal was due to the negligence of the learned counsel. There is no doubt that a litigant should not be penalized either for the fault or for the wrong advice of his engaged lawyer but in the instant case though the ap­plicant-appellant was informed again and again by his counsel regarding non-filing of the appeal in time, then also he had pursued such lawyer and persistently gone on misun­derstanding regarding the period of limitation. 6. By this time, it is the settled position of law that every wrong advice/negligence of the counsel will not ipso facto amount to suffi­cient cause entitling a