Heard Mr. P. Khataniar, learned counsel for the appellant. None has entered appearance on behalf of respondents despite service of notice.

2. This appeal, preferred by the plaintiff, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.6.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon, in Title Appeal No. 24/2002 dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 27.9.2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hojai in Title Suit No. 20/2000.

3. By an order dated 10.01.2005, this Second Appeal was admitted to be heard on the following substantial questions of law:

“1. Whether the sale deed (Ext. 3) was legally proved as required under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act?

2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff can be dismissed by holding that the right, title and interest of the defendants has ripen by adverse possession without there being any pleading to that effect in the written statement?”

4. At the very outset, Mr. Khataniar has submitted that substantial question of law No. 1 may be modified as to whether the sale deed, Ext.-3, was legally proved inasmuch as there is no requirement in law for attestation of a sale deed.

5. I find substance in his argument and, accordingly, the substantial question of law No. 1 is re-framed as under:

“Whether the sale deed, Ext.-3, was proved in accordance with law?”

6. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit land measuring 1 bigha 2 katha of “bari land” representing the entire land of Dag No. 319 under Periodic Patta No. 39 of Buragaon Kissam was annual patta land belonging to one Sabal Kurmi. On payment of requisite premium, the suit land was converted to periodic patta on 13.01.1973 and the patta was issued in the name of Sabal Kurmi. While in possession, Sabal Kurmi, being in need of money, sold the suit land to the plaintiff by a registered sale deed, being Sale Deed No. 7910/74 dated 04.09.1974, and delivered possession. The plaintiff already had a homestead land across the intervening public road and the defendants’ predecessor, Prafulla Kumar Das, a refugee from Bangladesh who was working as a wage earner, was allowed to stay on the said land temporarily without payment of any rent. On or about 01.01.1990, he built a small bamboo thatched house on a small part of the land and started residing in the house with his wife and children and, thereafter, in the last part of 1991, the plaintiff asked the predecessor of the defendants, Prafulla Kumar Das, to vacate the suit land. He prayed for some time to vacate and, eventually, he died in 1992. Request for vacating the suit land was made by the plaintiff from time to time but no heed was paid by the defendants and, on the contrary, they were extending their occupation of land by constructing more houses. On 1.10.2000, once again demand was made to vacate the suit land and the defendants refused to vacate the suit land by stating that they have right, title and interest in respect of the suit land. Under these circumstances, the suit was filed praying for declaration, khas possession and permanent injunction in respect of Schedule-A land.

7. In the written statement, in Paragraph 7, it was pleaded that “the suit is barred by adverse possession and it is not maintainable for limitation”. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the title for long possession of the suit land by the defendants. That the suit land originally belonged to one Sabal Kurmi is admitted and it is pleaded that by a registered sale deed No. 3375/77, Sabal Kurmi had sold the suit land to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants and delivered possession and, since then, they, along with their predecessor-in-interest, were in occupation of the suit land for more than 33 years. Description of the northern boundary of the suit land was stated to be wrong and it was pleaded that the suit was filed on imaginary facts. It is also pleaded that the defendants have dwelling houses on the s