The procedures under the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 prevail over the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in matters of securing hypothecated vehicles and the recovery of dues.

1. Heard Mr. B.D. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. N.P. Devi, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.

2. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 08.08.16 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Guwahati in connection with I.A. No. 19/2015 and 20/2016 arising out of O.A. No.170/2016. By filing the said O.A.No.170/2016, the respondent No.1/bank had prayed before the Tribunal for recovery of a sum of Rs.22,87,706.70 which had accrued against a loan obtained for purchasing a commercial vehicle. The said vehicle was hypothecated with the respondent No1/bank and the said vehicle was bearing Registration No.AS-01-GC-1055.

3. The petitioner has projected that he had lodged an FIR before the Williamnagar Police Station on 28.04.2016 alleging that hypothecated vehicle was stolen. The petitioner has alleged that it has come to his knowledge that the hypothecated vehicle was surreptitiously sold by the respondent/bank in collusion with some other persons and as per the record procured from the concerned district transport office, it was learnt that the vehicle was shown to have been owned by one Sri Rupak Deka and the sale price in respect of the said vehicle was not credited to his bank account. The petitioner has further stated that in connection with O.A.No.170/2016, the respondent No.1/bank had filed two interlocutory application, one being I.A.No.20/2016 with the prayer for direction to take custody of the hypothecated property by removing the same from the possession and custody of the respondent or any other their party with further permission to sell the same, and the 2nd application which was registered as I.A.No.19/2016 was filed with a prayer to appoint a receiver with direction to take custody of the hypothecated property by removing the same from the possession and custody of the respondent or any other their party with further permission to sell the same. The petitioner had filed his identical written objection in both IA's wherein, amongst others, the petitioner has stated that the hypothecated vehicle was stolen on 27.04.2016 and as the petitioner did not have custody of the vehicle, the said two applications were intended to cause mischief.

4. Learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, Guwahati by its common order dated 08.08.16 has passed an interim order wherein it has been observed that when the vehicle is not in possession of the respondent, who had already lodged an FIR, hence, no prejudice is cause to the respondent if a Receiver is appointed in respect of the vehicle. It has also recorded in the said order that the applicant before the Tribunal had withdrawn I.A. No.20/2016 and the same was dismissed on withdrawal.

5. The petitioner, therefore, submits that he is aggrieved by the said order dated 08.08.2016 passed in I.A.No.19/2016 and states that he had filed his written statement wherein in Annexure-2 he has produced the record of the vehicle being owned in the name of Rupak Deka where the financer name has been shown as HDFC Bank showing the date of registration of the vehicle as on 19.04.2016. The petitioner has also annexed to his written statement before the Tribunal, the statement of accounts which is from the period of 07.03.2015 to 01.08.2016. The ground of challenge in this revision petition is, firstly, that the order which has been passed by the Tribunal was essentially an order of attachment and as the order of attachment was passed without allowing him time to show cause and without requiring him to furnish security and, as such, the said order is in violation of the provisions of Section 19(13)(A) and Section 19(13)(B) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, secondly, as the police investigation is already underway before the Williamnagar Police Station, the petitioner has an indefeasible right to take recourse to the criminal law as permissible under Section 102(3) and