N. Kotiswar Singh, J.

Heard Dr. Th. Suresh Singh, the petitioner in person, Ld. Advocate General for the State as well as Sri A. Romenkumar Singh, Ld. Amicus Curiae.

2. The present PIL has been filed seeking for a direction to the State Respondents to fill up the vacancies of the members and other supporting staff of the Manipur Human Rights Commission within a specified time frame and also to depute an officer not below the rank of a Secretary to the Government of Manipur as provided under sub-section (1)(a) of Section 27 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and also to depute a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector General of Police as provided under Section 27(1)(b) of the Act.

3. The importance of establishing the State Human Rights Commission had been stressed time and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court through various judicial decisions. We may only refer to a recent judicial pronouncement in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (2015) 8 SCC 744 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborately dealt with the history, establishment, functioning and scope of the State Human Rights Commissions. We would therefore, prefer to speak in the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as far as these are relevant and appropriate.

4. After tracing the history on the enactment of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that setting up of a State Human Rights Commission is a mandatory requirement and is not dependent upon the discretion of the State Government.

This is what the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in D.K. Basu in the following words:

"10. .............. It is true that a plain reading of the provisions may give the impression that the setting up of a State Human Rights Commission rests in the discretion of the State Government. But a closer and more careful analysis of the provisions contained in the Act dispel that impression.

11. ................"A plain reading of the above would show that Parliament has used the word "may" in sub-section (1) of Section 21 while providing for the setting up of a State Human Rights Commission. In contrast Parliament has used the word "shall" in Section 3(1) while providing for constitution of a National Commission. The argument on behalf of the defaulting States, therefore, was that the use of two different expressions which dealing with the subject of analogous nature is a clear indication that while a National Human Rights Commission is mandatory a State Commission is not. That argument is no doubt attractive, but does not stand close scrutiny. The use of the word "may" is not by itself determinative of the true nature of the power or the obligation conferred or created under a provision. The legal position on the subject is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. The stated position is that the use of the word "may" does not always mean that the authority upon which the power is vested may or may not exercise that power. Whether or not the word "may" should be construed as mandatory and equivalent to the word "shall" would depend upon the object and the purpose of the enactment under which the said power is conferred as also related provisions made in the enactment. The word "may" has been often read as "shall" or "must" when there is something in the nature of the thing to be done which must compel such a reading. In other words, the conferment of the power upon the authority may having regard to the context in which such power has been conferred and the purpose of its conferment as also the circumstances in which it is meant to be exercised carry with such power an obligation which compels its exercise."

5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also examined the scheme of the legislation to come to the aforesaid conclusion in the following words,

"17.1. That the Act is aimed at providing an efficacious and transparent mechanism for prevention of violation of human rights both at national level as also at the Sta