MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, J.

1. Heard Mr. Joseph L. Rentlei, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Roshan Subedi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. Zochhuana, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. No one appears for the respondent No. 1.

2. The appellant has challenged the impugned Judgment & Order dated 15.07.2016, issued by the MACT, Lunglei in MAC Case No. 3/2014, by which the appellant's claim for payment of cost of repair of his Gypsy has been dismissed, on the ground that the learned Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages caused to a motor vehicle.

3. The appellant's counsel submits that the learned Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellant's claim for compensation for damages caused to his Gypsy due to an accident involving the appellant's Gypsy and the 207 Truck belonging to the respondent No. 1. He submits that the learned Tribunal had wrongly interpreted section 141 & 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and held that the learned Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the appellant.

4. Mr. Roshan Subedi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that as the respondent No. 2 is the Insurance Company, which insured the owner of the Gypsy, i.e., the appellant, the respondent No. 2 has no comments to make in this matter, as no claim has made against the appellant. He also submits that the learned Tribunal has the jurisdiction and is competent to decide the present issue involved in the appeal.

5. Mr. Zochhuana, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 also submits that the learned Tribunal, Lunglei has the jurisdiction and competence to decide the claim made by the appellant, if fault is proved on the part of the owner and driver of the 207 Truck, which was involved in the accident.

6. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

7. The claim petition was submitted by the appellant for the cost of the repaired damage caused to his Gypsy, due to a collision between the appellant's Gypsy bearing Registration No. MZ O2 A 0276 and TATA (207) RXDI, bearing Registration No. MZ O1 H 3843. There was apparently an agreement made between the appellant and the respondent No. 1, to the effect that the cost for repair of the damage caused to the Gypsy would be paid by the respondent No. 1. The appellant thereafter submitted his bills of repair to the respondent No. 1, which was not acted upon. The appellant thereafter filed MAC Case No. 3/2014 before the MACT, Lunglei. The learned Tribunal however dismissed the appellant's claim petition on the ground that damage caused to the motor vehicle, could not be agitated before the Tribunal, as the definition of property did not include a motor vehicle.

8. Section 145 (e) defines property as follows:-

"property" includes goods carried in the motor vehicle, roads, bridges, culverts, causeways, trees, posts and mile-stones."

9. Section 141 of the MV Act, 1988 provides for claiming compensation for death or permanent disability and Section 147 of the MV Act provides for the requirement of policies and limits of liabilities in respect of policy of insurance issued by an insurance company.

10. In the case of Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685, the Apex Court has held in para 23 as follows:-

"It is trite to say that when in the definition clause given in any statute the word "means" is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word "means" is used in the definition, to borrow the words of Lord Esher M.R in Gough v. Gough it is a "hard-and-fast" definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. (Also see P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology). On the other hand, when the word "includes" is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordi