Point of Law : Constitution of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal itself under Section 110 is, as the section states for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to.

ORDER :

Hear Mr. R. Goswami, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Ms. R. Mozumder, learned Counsel representing the respondents.

2. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the judgment and award dated 21.04.2018 passed by the MACT No. 3, Kamrup, in MAC Case No. 627/2015.

3. On 15.01.2015, at about 8.30 AM, the vehicle bearing registration no. AS-01-FC-4845 knocked down one Sri Chandra Kanta Hazarika and he died because of the said accident. Claim application has been filed in the Tribunal seeking compensation.

4. The Insurance Company contested the claim and also admitted that the said vehicle was involved in the said accident. The owner and the driver of the vehicle did not contest the claim.

5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues :

(i) Whether the victim Sri Chandra Kanta Hazarika died in the alleged road traffic accident dated 15.01.2015 at about 8.30 AM at Amlighat under Jagiroad Police Station, due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Swift Dezire vehicle bearing registration no.AS-01-FC-4845?

(ii) Whether the claimants are entitled to any compensation, if yes, to what extent and from whom.

6. The respondents examined four witnesses and the Insurance Company did not examine any witnesses.

7. On the basis of the evidence of record, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs.42,57,448/- along with interest @ 7.5 % per annum from the date of filing of claim petition, as compensation.

8. The appeal has been filed on two grounds, one is that the deceased left behind three legal heirs and, therefore, the learned Tribunal erroneously deducted one-third from the income of the deceased and the second is that the respondents received Rs.9,50,000/- from his employer in respect of Group Personal Accident Insurance Policy. The appellant further submits that the respondents also received an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- as financial assistance in lieu of appointment on compassionate ground.

9. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the both sides.

10. Mr. Goswami has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court that was rendered in Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and others v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 90, where it was held as under :

“32. So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death with the “pecuniary advantage” which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, correlating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident, through train, air flight not involving a motor vehicle, it would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of the general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must correlate to this type of injury or death, viz., accidental. If the words “pecuniary advantage” from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act, it would dilute all possi