Abdul Gafoor, J.

This Second Appeal is by the defendants 6 to 13. The only substantial question of law raised and urged before means as follows:

“On the facts and features of the case, whether the lower appellate court was right in not drawing a presumption on due execution of Ext.B1 will, which is 30 years old, as contained in Section 90 of the Evidence Act?”

2. The entire case set up by the appellants/defendants 6 to 13 centers around Ext.B1 Will, which is taken as a defence against the claim for partition by the plaintiff, one among the sisters of the appellant. The facts are as follows;

3. One Narayana Hedge, the father of the partied died in the year 1979, leaving his widow, defendant No.1 who died during the pendency of the suit, plaintiff and defendants 2 to 5, five daughters and the appellants/defendants 6 to 13, 8 sons. The parties are governed by Mithakshara Hindu Law. According to the plaintiff, her share in the property was not given to her in spite of the persistent demand. Finally it resulted in Ext.A1 suit notice for partition. This was replied to in Ext.A2 notice sent on behalf of the appellants, who took up the plea that the plaintiff was not entitled to partition or to any share in the property left by the said Hedge, as he had executed Ext.B1 Will on 5/4/62. In the wake of this reply, the plaintiff instituted a suit alleging that Ext.B1 Will was forged and that there was no reason for him to execute a will excluding all the 5 daughters including her and their mother from inheriting the properties left by him. The suit was defended on the strength of Ext.B1 Will contending that it was duly executed by the father of the parties.

4. The parties want to trail. The evidence consists of Exts.A1 to A7 and the testimony of PW1, husband of the plaintiff on the side of the plaintiff and Exts.B1 to B4 and the oral testimony of DW1, the 6th defendant and DW2, who is said to be the scribe of Ext.B1, on the side of the defendants 6 to 13, the appellants.

5. Appreciating the evidence on record, the trial court came to the conclusion that “no person other than DW2 was examined to prove the execution of the Will” and that “the evidence of DW2 alone is not sufficient since a Will is a document which requires attestation and when the attestation is not proved, it cannot be said that the Will is true and genuine.” The suit was accordingly decreed allowing 1/4th share in the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff. The defendants 6 to 13 carried the matter in appeal before the District Court, Kasaragod. Considering the matter in detail, the lower appellate court “after having very anxiously re-evaluated and re-appreciated all the relevant facts” found that “the oral evidence of DW1 about the execution of B1 can be rejected without hesitation and the oral evidence of DW2 is not sufficient to inspite confidence” because, according to the lower appellate court “it is not possible to accept and act upon the oral evidence of DW2 alone to come to the conclusion that the Will has been duly executed.” Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. It is in the above circumstances, this second appeal has been filed.

6. It is contended by the counsel for the appellant heavily relying on the decision reported in Munnalal & Others V. Kashibai & Ors. (1947 PC 15) and Acho Dominic V. Xavier (2000 (2) KLT 402 that Ext.B1 being a document of more than 30 years old, the presumption statutorily available in terms of Section 90 of the Evidence Act ought to have been applied in the case by the courts below without insisting for further proof of the Will. The Will is dated 5.4.62 and the Will was introduced in evidence by examining DW2 on 7/10/93, after a lapse of 30 years. DW2 had spoken to that according to his information the attestors were not alive at that point of time. Therefore, applying Section 90 of the Evidence Act, the Court below ought to have presumed the due execution and attestation of the Will, Ext.B.1. That fact has only been corrob