Radhakrishnan, J.

Question that has come up for consideration in this case is whether a writ of mandamus can be issued directing the Marriage Officer to entertain an application which was submitted without complying with Section 15(f) of the Special Marriage Act on the ground that the provision is directory.

2. Petitioners have approached this court challenging Ext.P-4 order dated 18-7-2007 issued by the Marriage Officer rejecting the petitioners' application stating that they have not satisfied the provisions of Section 15(f) of the Special Marriage Act. Petitioners submit that Section 15(f) being a directory provision a writ of mandamus can be issued to receive the application, though the condition stipulated therein has not been satisfied. Petitioners had solemnized their marriage on 16-7-2007 at St. John Baptist Church at Palarivattom and hardly two days thereafter they preferred an application before the Marriage Officer under Section 15 of the Special Marriage Act for registration of the marriage. Marriage Officer rejected the application since the petitioners have not resided for a period of 30 days within the jurisdiction of that Officer; before submitting the application. Petitioners have therefore not satisfied the condition stipulated in Section 15(f) of the Act. Petitioners maintained the stand that Section 15(f) being a directory provision the Marriage Officer has got the discretion to waive the requirements.

3. In Deepak Krishnan and another v. District Registrar and others (I.L.R. 2007 (3) Kerala 256) this court has held that Section 15 of the Special Marriage Act is a directory provision. But the question posed in this case is, being a directory provision can the petitioners seek a writ of mandamus directing the Marriage Officer to accept such an application filed before the expiry of thirty days as provided under Section 15(f) of the Act. We have examined the scope of Section 15 in the above case and held as follows:

"Under such circumstances, we are inclined to take the view that Clause (f) of Section 15 is only a directory provision, and the failure to follow the said clause strictly would not make the registration of the marriage under the Act invalid. Failure to follow that clause does not render a thing duly done in disobedience of it, a nullity. It is trite law that a directory provision as such gives no discretionary power to do a thing not directed. Even if a provision is directory in nature, it should be substantially complied with."

Directory provision is distinct from a discretionary provision. Directory provision gives no discretion-it is intended to be obeyed, but failure to obey it does not render a thing duly done in disobedience of it, a nullity. Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, at page 250, stated as follows:

"It is stated', said Denman, J. in Caldow v. Pixell [(1877) 2 C.P.D. 562, 566] that in general the provisions of statutes creating duties are directory." By this is meant not that it is optional on the pan of a public functionary whether he will perform duties imposed upon him by statute, but that if a public functionary neglects to perform a statutory duty of this kind that neglect on his part will not necessarily invalidate the whole operation with regard to which the statutory duty was to be performed. At the same time it must be borne in mind that it is not a universal rule that statutes which create public duties are merely directory. "In the absence of an expression provision, the intention of the legislature is to be ascertained by weighing the consequences of holding a statute to be directory or imperative."

It is trite law that directory provision is meant to be obeyed. In the case of mandatory provision strict Compliance of every law is necessary and in the case of directory provision it is not invalidated by such non-compliance alone. Resultantly it follows even a directory provision is intended to be obeyed and does not authorise its deliberate and conscious violat