Denesan, J.

Two writ petitions raising a common question have been referred to the Full Bench for decision. A learned judge of this court (Thottathil Radhakrishnan, J.) while considering W.P.(C) 4828/05 felt the need for the resolution of the apparent conflict between two bench decisions on the point. Accordingly, the matter came up before the Division Bench. Learned Judges of the Division Bench ordered the cases to be referred for determination by the Full Bench. Reference order passed by the learned single Judge brings to focus the point for consideration succinctly and the same may be usefully extracted below:

“The petitioner challenges Ext.P1 by which regular permit has been granted to the 2nd respondent subject to settlement of timings. An order granting permit is a revisable order under section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, even for that, the petitioner has to succeed a test as to his standing, thereby his entitlement to challenge the grant of permit in favour of the 2nd respondent.

2. By the decision of the Apex Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India (AIR 1992 SC 443) their lordships surveyed the 1988 Act in contradistinction with the relevant provisions of the 1939 Act and spoke on the legislative policy behind the changes made. It was noticed that a healthy competition in private sector was also one of the concepts that had weighed with the legislation of the new Act.

3. Following the decision in Mithilesh Garg’s case (supra) in C.T.R.B.T. Co-op. Society v. Mathew Job (1992 (1) KLT 297), a Division Bench of this court, after adverting to different earlier decisions of this court, found that the decision in Kunhikrishnan Nair v. R.T.O. (1991 (2) KLT 266) was no more good law, in view of the ratio in Mithilesh Garg’s case.

4. If the said decision of the Division Bench in C.T.R.B.T. Co-op. Society’s case (supra) is to be followed, the writ petitioner has to be non-suited by holding that he is not entitled to challenge Ext.P1 grant and thereby does not have the locus to file either a statutory revision under section 90 of the Act, or to file this writ petition. I say so because, the Division Bench in C.T.R.B.T. Co-op. Society’s case (supra) had categorically found that the existing operators have no right to object to the grant of permit to other stage carriage operators. Thereby it followed an earlier Division Bench decision in Girija Devi v. K.T. Mathew (1991 (1) KLT 353).

5. Placed in this situation, the Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to point out that the decision of the Apex Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. (1976 (1) SCC 671) referred to in Mithilesh Garg’s case (supra) has been watered down by the subsequent view in Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise (2000 (3) KLT 820). However, what is considered in Jayaraj’s case is a piece of law relatable to the privilege of vending liquor, whereas the matters relating to Motor Vehicles Act stand on a different footing and Mithilesh Garg’s case is one decided under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 itself, of which statute, we are now concerned with.

6. Be that as it may, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of the Division Bench of this court in Manu Kurikkal v. R.T.A. Malappuram (1999 (2) KLJ 459) rendered much later than in C.T.R.B.T. Co-op. Society’s case (supra) referred to above. Manu Kurikkal’s case has been decided without reference to C.T.R.B.T. Co-op. Society’s case (supra however, holding in para 12 that an operator, who is operating under the provisions of the Act, has got a right to insist that the provisions of the statute is complied with. It was accordingly that the objection as to locus raised in that case was overruled. In doing so, the Division Bench has relied on a decision of the Division Bench in P.K. Transport v. Calicut Wynad Motor Service (P) Ltd. & Others (1967 KLT 650), which, obviously, was a decision rendered under the old Act. The lea