( 1 ) THE first accused, Baiju, in C. C. No. 34/99, on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Thodupuzha, was convicted and sentenced, along with four other accused, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months each for the offence under sections 143 and 447 IPC, and simple imprisonment for six months each for the offence punishable under Sections 148 and 324 IPC. No separate sentence was awarded for the offence under section 147 IPC, though found guilty. All the five accused were also directed to pay an amount of Rs. 1000/= each to PWs. 1 and 2, the injured, as compensation, with the default sentence of simple imprisonment for a further period of two months each. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The findings of the trial court were challenged in Crl. A. Nos. 18/2003 and 36/2003, the former by the 5th accused, and the latter by accused 1 to 4, before the Additional Sessions Court, Thodupuzha. The appellate court found accused 4 and 5 not guilty of the offence, and, therefore, they were acquitted. However, the conviction and sentence in respect of accused 1 to 3 were confirmed. Hence, the first accused preferred this revision.

( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the revision, Crl. M. A. No. 1438/2006 had been filed stating that the injured, PWs. 1 and 2, Jobin and Renjith, had compounded the offence with the revision petitioner- first accused, and, therefore, they sought permission of the court to compound the matter. Counsel, Sr. P. Dalbi Emmanuel, appeared for the de facto complainants.

( 3 ) I heard the counsel on either side. I have gone through the principles contained under section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in short 'the Code'. Sub section (1) of section 320 of the code contains the offence that could be compounded and the persons by whom, it could be done. Sub section (2) of section 320 of the Code, further state the offence which could be compounded with the permission of the Court. As stated above, section 447 of the Indian Penal Code, in short 'the Penal Code', is compoundable under sub section (1) of section 320 of the code, and section 324 of the Penal code is compoundable with the permission of the court under subsection (2) of section 320 of the Code. However, sections 143, 147 and 148 of the Penal Code are not included either under sub section (1) or sub section (2) of section 320 of the Code.

( 4 ) THE question, therefore, arise for consideration is, when the parties to the proceedings are willing to settle the matter or an injured person compound the matter with the assailant, and such other offence with which the accused charged, do not fall within section 320 (1) or (2) of the Code, whether that offence could be compounded at the instance of the affected person (s ).

( 5 ) THE Apex court had an occasion to consider in B. S. Joshi and Others V. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675, the question about the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code read with Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to quash the criminal proceedings, when the parties have settled the matter among themselves, although the section of offence sections 498 A and 406 IPC, do not fall within section 320 of the Code. Interpreting the position laid down in Madhu Limaya V. State of Maharashtra (1977 (4) SCC 551), as well as section 482 of the Code, and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex court was of the view that, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstance if each case whether to exercise or not such a power. The court also laid down in State of Karnataka V. L. Muniswamy (1977 (2) SCC 699), that the inherent power of quashing a criminal proceedings under section 482 of the Code, in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court