One of the questions involved in these revisions is whether the defendants in the suit can be ordered to be detained in civil prison under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure for violation of the interim order passed by the court, when the suit was ultimately dismissed. The suit filed by the respondents was dismissed on 30.08.1999 and on the same day as per the order in I.A.Nos.1913 of 1998 and 1981 of 1998, the court held that the revision petitioners have violated the interim order passed by the trial court and they were ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of 30 days each. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners defendants against whom applications under Order XXXIX Rule 2A were filed, relies on the decision in Vasu vs. Thankamma (1981 K.L.T. 248). Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd (A.I.R. 1997 R.P.Nos.2118 and 2119 of 20002 S.C.1240) and contends that the dictum laid down in 1981 L.T. 248 is no longer good in view of the Supreme Court decision.

2. In Vasu vs. Thankamma, the allegation was that the defendant, against whom an order of injunction was in force, violated that order. The violation was alleged to have been made in the year 1976 and the plaintiff filed an application under rule 2A Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure on 16.02.1978. The suit was dismissed on 25.02.1978. Long there after, the trial court passed an order in the application for taking action for violation of injunction and held that the defendant had violated the order. In the revision filed by the defendant challenging that order, it was held that the trial court could not have passed the impugned order. This court held thus:

"3. The powers of the Civil Court to take action for disobedience of order of injunction are contained in O. 21 R. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure and O. 39 R.2A of the Code of Civil Procedure. O. 21 R.32 deals inter alia, with a case where a decree for injunction has been passed and the person who is bound by the decree wilfully fails to obey. In other words, that arises in a case where there is a decree which calls for enforcement. That is not the case here. O. 39 R. 2A deals with consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction passed not by the final decree in the suit but on an interlocutory application. In case of disobedience of any injunction or other order made under R.1 or R.2 of O. 39 the Court granting the injunction or making the order or the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred is empowered to attach the property of the defaulting party and also to detain such party in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2A indicates that the attachment itself is only for the purpose of compelling obedience, for it provides that the attachment shall not remain in force for more than one year at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues the property attached could be sold. In other words, if the disobedience does not continue by the time one year has passed there is no adverse consequence to the party. Attachment automatically ceases. Therefore attachment would not operate as an expropriatory measure or as a penal measure. In that setting detention in civil prison must also be held to be not intended as a penal measure but as a mode of enforcement of the injunction order. That is so is indicated by the Supreme Court in the decision in The State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR, 1961 SC 221. In paragraph 23 of the judgment the court observes:

"Though undoubtedly proceedings under O.39 R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure have a punitive aspect-as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order" If the provision in O.39 R.2A and the similar rule in