Ramachandran, J.

Concurrent finding entered into respectively by the Rent Controller, Tirur in R.C.P.No.23 of 1994 and the Appellate Authority, Manjeri in R.C.P.No.28 of 1995 is challenged by the tenant in these proceedings.

2. Mr. P. Chandrasekhar, appearing for the petitioner/tenant had confined his argument on one issue, namely as to the effect of the demise of the petitioner before the Rent Control Appellate Authority during the pendency of the appeal. He submits that the Appellate Authority had failed to take notice of the impact in its proper perspective. Advertence was made to the decisions of this court in Kutty Krishan V. Cheriyeri Raran [2001 (3) KLT SN 29 – Case No.41] as well as Jayarajan V. Yesoda [2003 (2) KLT 325].

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the landlords placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, reported as Kamleshwar Prasad V. Pradumanju Agarwal [AIR 1997 SC 2399] as well as Mathew V. Thomas v. Sali Sunny 2003 (1) KLJ 186.

4. The landlord, deceased Kammu, had filed an application under section 11 (2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (for short, the Act). According to him, the room was let out to the tenant in the year 1984, where she was running a Clinical Laboratory. He had been abroad and after coming to his native place he wanted to start a wholesale business in stationery and grocery, and as he had no other premises to start the business, he had required the tenant to vacate the room but it had been resisted.

5. The authorities below held that the landlord was entitled to get vacant possession, although the tenant had raised a contention that there was no bona fides in the claims made under section 11(3) of the Act and it is only a pretext for eviction.

6. The order was passed for eviction on 22-08-1995. An appeal had been preferred therefrom, but pending the appeal, the original landlord (Sri. Kammu) had passed away. A contention thereupon had been raised that the bona fide need, on which the claims rested, no more subsist. The Appellate Authority had been addressed that there was nothing on record to show that the legal heirs, who had been brought into the array of parties representing the landlord, ever wished to engage in any business that had been proposed to commence by deceased Kammu.

7. However, the Appellate Authority held that the contention as above was difficult to be accepted. It was held that the need pleaded could not be considered simply as personal. No circumstances were present to show that wife and children could not conduct the said business. Thereupon the appeal was dismissed.

8. Mr. Chandrasekhar had, with reference to the judgments referred to earlier, reagitated the contentions, but we find that it is difficult for him to successfully filed the arguments. Although there was not much of materials brought before the authority to show that what was intended was a family business, nevertheless the alleged paucity of materials in those region, according to us, is still insufficient for us to conclude that the need was really personal.

9. In Kutty Krishnan’s case (cited supra), the court had taken notice of the caution that was to be exercised while examining the impact of subsequent events. Of course, the position is well settled that in molding the relief, the situation which was available as on the date of the application need not unnecessarily bind the courts and changed circumstances do have an impact as it ought to be. In Jayarajan’s case (cited supra), the landlord/wife had pleaded for the cause of her husband, who was a dependent on her, for facilitating starting of a business. Mr. Chandrasekhar points out that the situation was identical namely that the husband had returned from Abu Dhabi service and wanted to start a grocery shop. Nevertheless we find that findings had been entered into by a Division Bench specifically holding that “after the death of her husband, there was no need for starting the business”. I