This revision petition is directed against a concurrent verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence in a prosecution under S.138 of the N.I. Act.

2. The cheque is for an amount of Rs. 50,000/- Signature in the cheque is admitted. Handing over of the cheque is not disputed. The notice of demand, though duly received and acknowledged, did not evoke any response. The complainant examined his Power of Attorney holder as PW1. He was allegedly a witness to the transaction also. The Manager of the drawee bank was examined as PW2. No defence evidence whatsoever was adduced. The courts below concurrently came to the conclusion that all ingredients of the offence punishable under S.138 of the N.I. Act have been established. Accordingly they proceeded to pass the impugned concurrent judgments.

3. Before the trial court, though no reply was given to the notice of demand, a defence was attempted to be raised that the cheque was issued not for the discharge of any legally enforcible debt/liability, but only as security when a transaction for a much lesser amount was entered into between the complainant and the accused. That cheque leaf was being misutilised by the complainant and PW1 to stake totally unsustainable and false claim against the petitioner. It was contended that the complainant and PW1 were members of a beneficiary committee and as their benamidar the petitioner had undertaken some work. It is in connection with that work that the earlier transaction was entered into and the blank cheque was allegedly given, it was contended.

4. The courts below came to the conclusion that this version advanced by the accused cannot be accepted. It is not proved at all, it was held. It was accordingly that the impugned judgments were passed.

5. Called upon to explain the nature of challenge which the petitioner wants to mount against the impugned concurrent judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates the contentions raised before the courts below. He raises a further contention with the help of the decisions reported in Shaji v. Reghunandanan (1999 (3) KLT SN 82, case No.85), Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and Another. (1999) 3 SCC 573), Janki Vashdeo v. Indusind Bank (2005 (2) KLT 265) and Muthukaruppan v. Raghavan (2006 (2) KLT 996) (Madras High Court) that the ingredients of the offence punishable under S.138 of the Act have not been established and the evidence of PW1 should not be accepted when the complainant did not choose to mount the witness box and tender evidence. Necessary adverse inference can be drawn, it is contended.

6. The decisions referred above, according to me, do not at all lay down a proposition of law that the complainant must mount the witness stand and tender evidence in support of his case invariably in all prosecutions under S.138 of the Act. That is not the law at all. The complainant can prefer the complaint through his Power of Attorney holder. But the Power of Attorney holder does not step into the shoes of the complainant when he comes to tender evidence on, the disputed aspects. Merely because the principal has the personal knowledge, a Power of Attorney holder cannot tender evidence of facts exclusively within the knowledge of the principal. This and this alone is laid down in the decisions referred above. The rule of hearsay evidence wilt not permit a person to speak of facts exclusively in the knowledge of another merely because he happens to be the holder of a Power of Attorney of such person. But these decisions referred above do not at all lead to the conclusion that a witness examined on the side of the complainant even if he be the Power of Attorney, is not competent to speak of facts within his exclusive personal knowledge.

7. The question then is only whether PWI, who is examined as a witness in this case on the side of the complainant did really have the requisite competence to testify before the court. Merely because he is the Power of Attorney, his competence to speak of facts exclusi