Does the decision in Ramakrishnan v. Parthasaradhy (2003 (2) KLT 613) deserve reconsideration? This is the question raised in this revision petition, which is directed against a concurrent verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

2. The cheque is for an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- and bears the date 19.3.1999. Signature in the cheque is admitted. Handing over of the cheque is not disputed. The short relevant contention raised is that the cheque was issued not for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt/liability. The liability, which is claimed to be discharged, is one that was barred under the law of limitation of the date of the cheque. The complainant examined himself as PW1 and proved Exts.P1 to P6. The accused examined himself as DW1.

3. The court below concurrently came to the conclusion that all ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act have been established and that the petitioner has not succeeded in establishing the defence urged by him. Accordingly they proceeded to pass the impugned concurrent judgments.

4. Called upon to explain the nature of challenge which the petitioner wants to mount against the impugned concurrent judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner fairly concedes that under the law as it stands now, a cheque issued for the discharge of a time barred debt, will have to be held to fall within the purview of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The short contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the decision of the Division Bench in Ramakrishnan v. Parthaaradhy (2003 (2) KLT 613) requires reconsideration. The learned counsel submits that there cannot be acknowledgment of a barred liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and in as much as the cheque in question is issued long after the efflux of period of limitation, it cannot be held to be one issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability.

5. This precise question was considered by the Division Bench on a reference in Ramkrishnan’s case (supra), The division Bench relying on the provisions of Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act and Section 46 of the N.I. Act had come to the conclusion that the cheque drawn for the discharge of time barred liability would still fall within the purview of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the precise question as to whether such an acknowledgment can be reckoned as a valid acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act in the light of the decisions in Commr. Of Income tax v. M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (AIR 1954 SC 429), Chacko Varkey v. Thommen Thomas (1957 KLT 870 (FB), Ramachandran v. Velaydhan (1986 KLT 647) and Food Corporation of India v. Assam State Co-op. Marketing & Consumer Federation Ltd. (2004) 12 SCC 360) was not specifically considered by the Division Bench and in these circumstances the said decision may require reconsideration.

7. I have considered the submissions. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. It is evident that the decision of the Division Bench does not rest on the interpretation of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships had clearly held that a promise to pay a time barred debt cannot be assailed as an unenforceable promise on the ground that there is not consideration and the cheque issued for the discharge of such a liability would fall within the sweep of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

8. I shall assume that the liability, to discharge which the cheque is issue, is time barred. But even then the drawing of a cheque involves the acts of writing the cheque signing the same and delivering the same. The act of drawal of the cheque – Section 138 applies to a cheque drawn only – does include writing the cheque, signing the same and delivery of the written and signed cheque. By the time the third conduct of delivery takes place and the drawal of the cheque becomes complete, t