The court emphasized that the lessee of a trustee is not entitled to set up any independent claim as against the beneficial owners of the trust unless the law upholds the lease independent of the junction of the trustee.

This Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiffs in a suit filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. This appeal is confined to the rights of the 7th defendant.

3. The necessary facts are as follows:

The suit was filed alleging mismanagement of the 1st plaintiff Trust. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree on 17-12-1993 for settling a scheme for the proper management and administration of the temple and its properties; declaring the right of the plaintiffs and the general public in the locality to participate in the management and administration of the temple, appointing a new trustee for the 1st plaintiff temple (Trust) and ordering removal of the 1st defendant trustee from the management of the temple and its properties; directing the 1st defendant to surrender all the documents and properties, movable and immovable, to the new trustees; declaring that the documents, Lease Deed No.1380/56. Release Deed No.2775/68, Sale Deed No.2776/68, Lease Deed No.2961/69, Mortgage Deed No.489/69, Mortgage Deed No.201/70 and Sale Deed No.3592/73 are null and void and not binding on the 1st plaintiff trust; directing the 1st defendant to account for the income of the trust from its properties after 1125 M.E. and allowing the new trustees to recover the amount found due from the 1st defendant, who was also restrained from taking any steps in the management of the trust or keeping the assets of the trust or to collect any annuity from the Government to the temple and causing obstruction to the worshippers or alienating the assets of the temple.

4. A.S.83/1995 was filed by the 1st defendant, A.S.84/1995 was filed by the 2nd defendant and A.S.85/1995 was filed by the 7th defendant. The 1st defendant died pending the appeals and his legal representatives prosecuted his appeal. The lower appellate court allowed the appeals by the 1st defendant and by the 2nd defendant in part and allowed the appeal of the 7th defendant (A.S.85/1995) in toto. Accordingly, the liability of the 1st defendant to render accounts was limited for a period of three years immediately prior to suit and the decree for injunction against him was set aside as having become infructuous on his death. The direction for removal of the 1st defendant and the injunction against him were vacated noticing that he was dead pending first appeal. The declaration granted by the trial court as regards Lease Deed No.1380/56, Mortgage Deed No.201/70 and Mortgage Deed No.3592/73 was set aside and the suit to the extent it relates to the 7th defendant was dismissed by the lower appellate court. The validity of the said documents and the claim of fixity of tenure which was found against him by the trial court were left open for consideration in appropriate proceedings. The other declarations and directions were retained.

5. This Second Appeal is by the plaintiffs challenging the decision of the lower appellate court in so far as it related to vacating the declarations and directions in relation to the properties claimed by the 7th defendant on the strength of documents, Lease Deed No.1380/56, Mortgage Deed No.201/70 and Mortgage Deed No.3592/73 and the consequential dismissal of the suit to that extent.

6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the respondent (7th defendant), the following substantial questions of law are formulated:

i. Whether the lease of a delinquent trustee who has been ordered to account and deliver properties and documents of the trust to the new trustees is liable to be disposed by a decree in a suit filed invoking Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

ii. Does the 7th defendant have any claim independent of the delinquent trustee who has been ordered to account and deliver up?

iii. What are the rights of a lessee of the type of the respondent, 7th defendant?

7. The trial court had ordered removal of the 1st defendant trustee. This finding was vacated by the lower appellate court since the 1st defendant was no more and